



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: REALIZING THE VISION OF  
ENLIGHTENED MODERATION**

by

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June 2006

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> June 2006	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's Thesis	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Stability in Pakistan: Realizing the Vision of Enlightened Moderation			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Capt. Tanya M. Murnock, USMC				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A			<b>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b> <p>In its nearly 60 years of independence, Pakistan has never fully established an identity for itself that has not been restructured by subsequent administrations. The military is one of the main elements of the federal political machine, and as such has assumed control of the government no less than four times in those 60 years – the first occurring shortly after independence when Pakistan's founding father died before a government could be structured and formed. The current military ruler has stated his intention for a lasting establishment of a moderate and successful Muslim state. With the spread of radical militant Islam throughout the region and the United States' War on Terror as his constraints, President General Pervez Musharraf finds himself in a position where success now is crucial, not optional. The purpose of this study is to understand the environment in which Musharraf has to work, including some of his constraints, restraints and assets; provide a limited evaluation of the success of his policies to date; and to offer recommendations to Pakistan and to the United States for ways in which the plans can be modified to see a more effective realization of a stable, modern, successful development of Pakistan.</p>				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Pakistan, Islam, Politics, Musharraf, Enlightened Moderation, Pervez Musharraf, secularization and modernity			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 103	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UL	

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**STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: REALIZING THE VISION OF ENLIGHTENED  
MODERATION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

from the

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## **STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: REALIZING THE VISION OF ENLIGHTENED MODERATION**

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the public policy and programs of Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf administration, and in light of Pakistan's unique history and culture, to offer recommendations for Pakistan and the United States for the successful realization of Musharraf's "Enlightened Moderation" plan for a successful, stable Pakistan.

In its nearly 60 years of independence, Pakistan has never fully established an identity for itself that has not been restructured by subsequent administrations. The military is one of the main elements of the federal political machine, and as such has assumed control of the government no less than four times in those 60 years – the first occurring shortly after independence when Pakistan's founding father died before a government could be structured and formed. The current military ruler has stated his intention for a lasting establishment of a moderate and successful Muslim state. With the spread of radical militant Islam throughout the region and the United States' War on Terror as his constraints, President General Pervez Musharraf finds himself in a position where success now is crucial, not optional.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Acknowledging these problems and Musharraf's own part in the story, we believe that Musharraf's government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan – *The 9/11 Commission Report*<sup>1</sup>

### A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE

The purpose of this thesis is to provide solutions to the question of how Pervez Musharraf can ensure the successful implementation of this political vision of a moderate Muslim state in Pakistan, and whether the United States should consider revising its policy. While no one proposal is ever the perfect solution to a goal, to address every possible solution would require much more depth than can be covered here. This thesis will focus on the feasibility, practicality, and probability of success of one plan: that of Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation. Additionally, it analyzes Musharraf's plan in light of domestic and regional influence, in order to recommend modifications to enhance the likelihood of success. This thesis evaluates the practicality of Musharraf's goal, given the constraints of Pakistan's political environment. Nothing exists in a vacuum, especially the development of a nation. Before any analysis or recommendations can be valid, a rudimentary understanding of the historical, regional and political influences that have shaped today's Pakistan must be established.

First, a review of the history and evolution of the use of religion as a mobilization tool for the realization of political goals in the region that is now Pakistan, and evaluate the influence of radical Islamist groups in rural and tribal Pakistan today. This review will serve to illustrate a passive acceptance of political hijacking of religious sentiment, and why this tactic is tolerated in the region. This tolerance is one force in mobilization against which Musharraf is competing for the realization of his vision; the abuse of which he referenced directly in the speech he gave after assuming the role of chief executive in October 1999.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 369.

<sup>2</sup> Speech by Chief Executive of Pakistan, CJCS and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, Islamabad, October 17, 1999.

The second issue for study is the influence from external forces on the evolution of Pakistani political and civil life. The resistance to Soviet expansion into Afghanistan; the Iranian Revolution; and influence from extreme religious factions originating from Saudi Arabia all came into play within the last 35 years. These influences were simply added to the pressure from the east, with lingering disparities with India since the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 yet unsolved.

Third is the state of the domestic and political structure of Pakistan today, including the societal factors and attitudes. Musharraf's vision for Pakistan and these environmental factors that led him to choose this path for his nation are outlined. This chapter also will review the courses of action Musharraf has implemented for the furtherance of his goal. U.S. foreign policy toward economic aid, security cooperation and emergency assistance is included here, completing the picture that illustrates resources, assistance and effectiveness of the actions taken by both countries.

This thesis concludes with a summary of the challenges Pakistan and Musharraf face, and suggestions for Pakistan and the United States to mitigate these challenges and to realize their common goals.

## **B. BACKGROUND**

Since its formation in 1947, Pakistan has undergone competing forces battling to define Pakistan's national identity and makeup. Since the terrorist attacks the United States in 2001, U.S. focus in Southwest Asia has been on the ousting of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the establishment of a new, stable government in that country, and Afghanistan's struggle to establish political stability and national unity.

While the stability of Afghanistan is important, U.S. security interests would be far better served with more support to the stability of Pakistan's current moderate government, and the reduction of radical Islamist groups within the country. Three issues should be of critical concern. First, the strategic importance of Pakistan's geographic location can be an asset to the United States, should Pakistan continue to develop into a stable, friendly ally. Its proximity to Afghanistan, China, India and Iran place it in the heart of American economic and security interests.

Second, it is in the United States' security interest to ensure that the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan remain in the control of a stable, rational, friendly government. Radical elements in this region have proven unpredictable; goals are determined by political desires, and realized by reinterpreting religious ideals in that favor. A change in political goals could easily turn into a massive turn of religious ideology to support a regime's whimsical use of overwhelming force against an adversary.

Finally, the identity of Pakistan – defining Pakistan nationalism – will be the key to uniting the population in a shared national identity. Marginalization of any region or segment of the population gives political extremists an opportunity to incorporate that element into its agenda. Historically, religious extremism has been used to promote regional resistance to central powers. A common vested interest in the future of a stable Pakistan could replace the influence of this extremism.

Since the war in Afghanistan began, Musharraf has provided valuable assistance to the United States, while inviting militant Islamist violence toward the Pakistan government. More recently, Musharraf has had to balance his cooperation with the United States with the leadership his people need, publicly opposing U.S. actions against Pakistani citizens while hunting suspected members of Al Qaeda, while taking care not to cut cooperation and access from across the border. Ultimately, a stable, prosperous, secular Muslim nation in Southwest Asia will serve as a building block for stability and the fight against violent Islamism in the region.

Attempts by other Muslim countries in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century to suppress the extremist elements or to deny religious expression for the purpose of secular modernity have met with violent opposition from their citizens. The 1979 Shi'a revolution in Iran; Egypt's imprisonment of militant Islamic factions; and Turkey's forced secularization following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire are all examples of the ways in which such imposed modernity by governments have resulted in the disenfranchisement of large sections of the population and at times mass revolt by the people to secure their freedoms to incorporate Islam into their society. A look at the provisions of Enlightened Moderation will determine where this plan differs from those of the past.

### C. PAKISTAN'S DUAL TRACKS

If the structure of governance can be described as the parallel application of two influences, e.g. religion and politics, then a similar description can be made about the ebb and flow of the level of influence each source had on Pakistan's attempts at identity and progress. The two influences can be compared to tracks of a train, each following a different route, yet ending up at the same destination. The destination here is a successful Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> The definition of "success" may differ from each track, so the more generalized vision will be used.

Track One will be identified here as the religious track. Whether labeled orthodox, traditional or fundamentalist, the leaders trying to follow this track see Pakistan as an opportunity for the formation of an Islamic state, or the ideal place where rules of law and daily life are dictated by interpretations of Islamic texts. Examples through Pakistan's history stem from the early 19<sup>th</sup> century until the formation of Pakistan, to include the establishment of the Deobandi and Bareilly traditions and madrasas; the Khilafat Movement; the rise of Jama'at-i Islami; the Partition following Independence from British rule in 1947; and, in more recent history, the governance of Muhammed Zia ul-Haq from 1977 until his death in 1988. The track gained new momentum in Afghanistan with the rise of Mullah Mohammed Omar and his Taliban militia in 1996, emboldening extremist faction within Pakistan to continue their opposition of moderate governments in Pakistan. Whether the influence is initiated by outside groups, or indicated from the government, the fault with this track is which brand of Islam – whose interpretation of Islamic law – is to be the standard by which all must live.

Track Two then can be the track of modernity. The Anglo-Muhammadan College in Aligarh was founded in the 1870s to provide Muslim students the education and skills to succeed as Muslims and professionals in the Western style of government established in India by the British.<sup>4</sup> Although established to cater to the Muslim community, the goal was to prepare students to function productively in a modern society. Further examples include the visions of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Iqbal in the establishment

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<sup>3</sup> Feroz H. Khan, interview by Tanya M. Murnock, April 13, 2006, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. Further expansion of the "two-track" description also credited to Khan.

<sup>4</sup> Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India 6<sup>th</sup> ed.* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), 250-3.

of Pakistan. Products of modern, western educations, the “Father of Pakistan” and his longtime colleague envisioned Pakistan not as a theocratic state ruled by clergy, but as a modern, secular nation where Muslims could practice and thrive free from oppression and discrimination.<sup>5</sup>

Musharraf plans to swing the pendulum back to the modernity track, but with a decidedly Islamic overtone. “Enlightened Moderation” refers to the modern path of today’s advanced nations, while recognizing that the makeup of Pakistani society is a Muslim one. Islam has its place in society, but the individual citizen’s interpretation of the way the faith of Islam is practiced – or the choice not to practice – will outweigh any ideas of institutionalized compulsion.<sup>6</sup> Using the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan for comparison, Barbara Metcalf’s observation that the Taliban’s success came not from the strict Islamist vision of governance, but because, “they were able to provide protection and stability in a context of warlordism, raping, and corruption.”<sup>7</sup> Were it not for the war weary populace, the Taliban may never have gotten enough support to promulgate its extreme ideology. However, with the Taliban on his western border, and common familial and tribal relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Musharraf’s vision of a moderate state ran against incredible odds. Until the United States began its War on Terror and took an active role in the region, Musharraf was on his own. One writer observed succinctly that during those years, “Musharraf weathered the storm, though uncertainty remained ascendant on the national horizon because of the lack of any major economic uplift, the international political situation, uninterrupted Indo-U.S. defense cooperation, and a populace increasingly disturbed over growing poverty, political waywardness, and an insecure future in an unstable as well as hostile region.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Wolpert, 341-3.

<sup>6</sup> Jehangir Karamat, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, in an interview with Tanya Murnock, in Washington, D.C., May 26, 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Contestations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 277.

<sup>8</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, “Pakistan in 2001: The Afghanistan Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline State,” *Asian Survey* 42, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 205.

#### **D. ENLIGHTENED MODERATION**

Although Musharraf detailed some vision of a modern and moderate Islamic society in his first speech as chief executive, the idea remained just an idea until after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Iran had presented an idea at the Organization of Islamic Countries that instead of what Samuel Huntington described as a Clash of Civilizations, leaders should be talking about a Dialog of Civilizations to try to understand the roots of terrorism and extremism. While many delegates to the conference are believed to have agreed with the concept, a concrete plan was not produced at that time.<sup>9</sup>

In Pakistan, however, Musharraf later developed a two-pronged strategy intended not only to stem terrorist activities, but to make the idea of religious extremism irrelevant, and at the same time promote growth and stability in Pakistan. The proximity of Afghanistan – host to the extremist elements that executed the attacks – and the U.S. government’s focused desire for justice made Islamabad realize that the time had come for a concrete, institutionalized plan to make this ideal a reality.

The two main efforts of the plan are the preventive measures against existing and emerging terrorist activities, and the development of solutions designed keep people from turning toward militant extremism.<sup>10</sup> Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Jehangir Karamat, believes that regimes in the past that tried to turn Pakistan toward a path of strict Islamic interpretation were never successful in the long term because the people of Pakistan wanted a society of representative governments, albeit an Islamic one. To take all references to faith out of public life would not only keep Musharraf’s domestic agenda from continuing after he leaves office, but would encourage militant extremists and enable their influence over susceptible minds.<sup>11</sup>

#### **Comparing Enlightened Moderation to Other Secularization Policies**

The idea to modernize and moderate Muslim nations is not new. Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War II, Turkey’s leader Mustafa

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<sup>9</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

<sup>10</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> Karamat, (May 26, 2006).



Kamal Attaturk made dramatic, sweeping changes to the face of Turkish public society. The western-educated leader believed that the Westphalian model of governance, with its strict separation of religion and government, was the only way to ensure successful growth in the future, internationally integrated world. This was particularly important in light of the previous identity of Turkey as the seat of the Muslim caliphate. A very secular government would illustrate the far swing away from Turkey's past. The country, however, has suffered significant internal social turmoil because of the extent to which Attaturk designed this concept for the nation. Outward expression of religion by individuals has been extremely limited. In its attempt to develop into a secular, western-style state, the government of Turkey has evolved to identify any outward expression of religion as an infringement on the secular society. Headscarves, for instance, are not allowed to be worn by women in any public institution – regardless of the woman's employment status or affiliation with the institution. The strict interpretation leaves many Muslims feeling that their freedom to practice their religion is being oppressed by the government.<sup>12</sup> Forbidding any outward expression of Islam in Pakistan would garner the same response as the compelled compliance with one Islamic interpretation: heavy resistance.

The Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran made similar sweeping social changes in the name of modernity and progress. The problems there stemmed from the lack of consideration to the population of Iran when these changes were enacted. The revisions under Reza Shah that hit closest to home again were those based on religious expression. Women were not only compelled to remove their veils, but had them pulled from their heads if the veils were worn in public. The impact on the clergy was small at first, with the imposition of a standardized and institutional system for the bestowing of religious titles. It was under this shah's successor, his son Muhammed Reza Shah that the people of all classes and affiliations were pushed past their breaking point. Land reforms were enacted with little or no regard for the quality of the land for farming. Property managed by the clergy, traditionally off limits to civil government, was taken in the name of the state. Besides the spiritual implications of the monarchy's interference, the balance of power also shifted, stripping the clergy of influence in the government, even at the local level. The

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<sup>12</sup> "Headscarf Ruling by the Turkish High Court Generates Tension," *Global Issues Report* (March 8, 2006).

merchant class fell victim to these changes in a drastic consequence. In the shah's vision to redesign the look of the cities, long established marketplaces were swept away to make room for the roads and parks that were to enhance the beauty of certain buildings – again without regard to the impact of the people.<sup>13</sup>

With so many elements of the population so dissatisfied with their system of government, a revolt of some sort seemed to be unavoidable. However, the one unifying factor of all marginalized parties was the religious element. This is not to say that the grievances of the clergy resonated with the other marginalized parties; but the charisma of Ruhollah Khomeini earned the backing of the factions. Many of these elements that supported Khomeini did so not because they favored the idea of theocratic rule, but because Khomeini rallied against the many bad decisions of the monarchy, and was seen as the best chance for success. Without the disenfranchised religious element, and the clergy's ability to spread the message through the mosques, perhaps no unified, dedicated opposition would have been waged against the crown – the diversified minority opposition would have had no other single “hero” to back.<sup>14</sup>

## **E. SUMMARY**

Khalid Mahmud Arif sums up his view of Pakistan's chances for success very nicely, writing, “Islam, an enlightened religion, has a remarkable flexibility in happily co-existing with other religions and cultures. A modern and moderate state, Pakistan has consistently abhorred extremism as an instrument of state policy. The country now enjoys freedom of expression. The rightist political parties are vociferous, and they attempt to arouse religious sensitivities on controversial issues.”<sup>15</sup>

Although no single opinion or plan for the development of a society will ever be absolutely correct, some policies have proven more effective than others. Global economics, religious and societal influences, external and historical influences will

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<sup>13</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 214-224.

<sup>14</sup> Nikki R. Keddie, “Religion, Ethnic Minorities, and the State in Iran: an Overview,” published in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, edited by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 160-162.

<sup>15</sup> Khalid Mahmud Arif, “The Role of the Military in Politics: Pakistan 1947-97,” *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*, Hafeez Malik ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 92.

always produce an ever changing, ever challenging mix of dynamics to which government policy must apply. The purpose of this study is to understand the environment in which Musharraf has to work, including some of his constraints, restraints and assets; provide a limited evaluation of the success of his policies to date; and to offer recommendations to Pakistan and to the United States for ways in which the plans can be modified to see a more effective realization of a stable, modern, successful development of Pakistan.

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## **II. ISLAM AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: FROM MOBILIZATION TO MISUSE**

There is a faulty perception among Muslims: that the West is attacking Islam. – Pervez Musharraf<sup>16</sup>

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The main conflict in the evolution of Pakistan's politics has been the struggle to define Pakistan's identity, represented generally by two ideals. One ideal is held by moderate thinkers, such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah in the beginning, and Pervez Musharraf today. The other ideal is that espoused by those who envision Pakistan society as a religious example to its Islamic neighbors, ruled by a system of governance that compels its citizens to live according to a strictly proscribed set of defined values. While neither ideal has been able to place Pakistan on a permanent path, each has its strong supporters.

When trying to analyze the effectiveness of President Musharraf's political goals and policies for Pakistan, it is important then to understand the history of political Islam in this region. In his speech five days after assuming the role of chief executive, Musharraf referenced the, "elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith."<sup>17</sup> Understanding the evolution of the mobilization of religious sentiment is the key to countering its opposition to modernity.

Religion is generally recognized as the most deeply ingrained and sensitive element of any person's existence. Therefore, it is little wonder why over the centuries political leaders have incorporated elements of religion and/or faith in their political campaigns and mobilization efforts. However, examples of this dichotomy over the course of history show a varied spectrum to describe the relationship of the religious message and the actual political goal. Taliban forces of Mohammed Omar best illustrate this phenomenon. In 1994, as Taliban influence moved across the Afghanistan landscape,

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<sup>16</sup> Pervez Musharraf, Sept. 28, 2004, resource online at [www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/EnlightenedModeration.aspx](http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/EnlightenedModeration.aspx), accessed May 10, 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Speech by Chief Executive of Pakistan, CJCS and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, Islamabad, October 17, 1999.

they had little reason to engage in battles. Besides the common ethnic roots with the war lords the Taliban enjoined, Michael Griffin attributed their success on their “skilful manipulation of religious intoxication” left over from the 10-year war against invading Soviet forces.<sup>18</sup>

It is this use, perhaps better described as “hijacking,” of a population’s religious convictions for the purpose of ensuring a political or power advantage that is so difficult for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s government to counter in the government’s quest for a moderate state. Understanding how this practice became so acceptable, and thereby so reliable, is the first step to developing a strategy to neutralize its effects.

In a book published in 1994, French political scientist Olivier Roy theorized that, “[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism makes it likely that Islam will long remain the dominant force in the mobilization of the Muslim world’s masses in times of crisis...”<sup>19</sup> He further noted that the difference between modern-day Islamism and its influential precursors, as they pertain only to politics and the governing of the masses, is that the influence of religion is effective only through the conversion of the people to said religion; and since worldwide conversion of the individuals is not likely, Islamism – referring in this instance to political influence based on the stated interest of Islam – holds the unique position of perpetuating the “us versus them” mentality that is so necessary in defining an adversary.<sup>20</sup>

In 1979, Mohammad Ayoob observed that the use of Islam as the motivating, legitimizing or mobilizing tool for political movements and leadership was prevalent, leading to the incorrect perception by outsiders that these misuses were part of the “same grand design” of Islam.<sup>21</sup> The integration of Islam and political leadership is not the problem. President Musharraf envisions a stable Pakistan that embraces Islam, in order to embody the Muslim character of Pakistan’s people. Indirectly this vision counters the

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<sup>18</sup> Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the Holy War*, revised ed., (Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2003), 12.

<sup>19</sup> Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 6.

<sup>20</sup> Roy, 6.

<sup>21</sup> Mohammad Ayoob, “The Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared,” *Asian Survey* 19, no. 6 (June 1979), 535.

perception that Muslim populations are about militancy and intolerance.<sup>22</sup> The problem Musharraf faces today is that his extremist opponents cite Islam as the motivating factor for their violent activities; when in fact their goals are for the survival of their own interpretation of Islam – a characteristic that bears striking resemblance to tribal identity power struggles elsewhere in the region – not for the future of the faith.

## **B. ISLAM AND POLITICS – A HISTORY**

It is certainly no stretch to find examples of combining religion and politics in Islam's history. The Prophet himself took over an entire city and became a head of state. Eventually, neighboring Byzantine and Persian territories were taken over and incorporated into the Muslim state.<sup>23</sup> Muhammad was asked early in his rule over Medina whether war was allowed against one's neighbors. At the time, Muhammad responded that it was not up to him to decide to wage war. Fourteen years after the Hijra, the Prophet declared that whenever outsiders attacked or showed aggression against those who stated their allegiance to God, those being attacked were permitted to fight back.<sup>24</sup>

The tradition of rule of the time supports the idea that outside aggressors would try to overrun nearby territories. Medina had negotiated relationships with neighboring tribes, guaranteeing Medina's support as long as the tribes agreed not to wage war on Medina. Additionally, it secured the assistance and resources of those tribes in the event that Medina was challenged.<sup>25</sup>

Eventually, Medina became the center of an expansive Muslim empire that stretched from Arabia to the West over North Africa, and to the East through Persia. The rule over these areas was considered fair by the residents – citizens of conquered territories were not required to convert to Islam, and their local culture was maintained.

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<sup>22</sup> Pervez Musharraf, "Time for Enlightened Moderation," <http://presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/EnlightenedModeration.aspx>, accessed September 4, 2005.

<sup>23</sup> John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 3d ed., Oxford University Press, New York (1988), 33.

<sup>24</sup> Qur'an 22:39-40, as interpreted by Mustansir Mir, "Islam, Qur'anic," *Encyclopedia of Religion and War*, ed. Gabriel Palmer Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 2004) 207-8.

<sup>25</sup> Mustansir Mir, "Islam, Qur'anic," *Encyclopedia of Religion and War*, ed. Gabriel Palmer Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 2004) 208.

As long as the citizens accepted Muslim rule and agreed to pay a tax, they were given many other personal freedoms to live and worship as they chose.<sup>26</sup>

This early example of faith tied to political gain, from most accounts, shows that though the empire was identified with the religion, in most matters religion and the conduct of state affairs was kept separate. Battles were fought to ensure the continued right of Muslims to practice, and for the opportunity to spread the word of Allah to those who would listen. It is just as easy to note, however, that very early in this evolution, leaders of these wars chose monetary and political gain in their conquests. Their faith inspired them, but the personal rewards motivated them.<sup>27</sup> This example illustrates that personal motivation can easily steer the believer in the wrong direction, regardless of any other intents. It also demonstrates that as early as the time of the Prophet, the line separating the spread and practice of the faith from physical warfare was blurred.

The importance of this thin line separating the faith of Islam from its politics lies in the reality that Islam is both faith and governance. It is at the same time the guide for living the correct spiritual life, and the outline of the correct interaction between people. One cannot be complete when taken on its own, without consideration of the other. It is because of this combined nature of Islam that makes it so easy to blur the line between the two. Historically, academic institutions have been a powerful tool for bringing Islamic communities together in the Indian subcontinent, but are another example of the ease with which whole communities can be swayed and the line between the two elements of Islam can be blurred.

### **C. ISLAMIC ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS**

Some regions of Pakistan today suffer from ingrained permissive attitudes that allow modern charismatic personalities to commandeer the power of religious commitment as a means to mobilize the masses toward an end-state of political power. This attitude did not develop recently, but over the course of more than a century.

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<sup>26</sup> Esposito, 33-35.

<sup>27</sup> Esposito, 33.



One of the most accepted establishments for the mobilization of Muslims in Pakistan is the madrasa. Begun as religious schools to keep the traditions and practices consistent in the region, several of these schools became centers of influence for political movements from the height of British power in India until the Afghan-Soviet war of 1979-89. A brief look at these schools' founding goals and political evolution sheds light on their influence in political life today.

### **1. Deoband Madrasa**

One of the earliest schools established for the purpose of teaching Muslim students in the Indian Subcontinent is the Dar ul-Ulum of Deoband. More commonly referred to simply as Deoband or the Deobandi School, the institution was established in 1867.<sup>28</sup> Although begun as an institution for structured learning, producing top religious advisors outside of the government system, the school became the launching point of many political – especially anti-British – mobilization movements.<sup>29</sup> The emphasis in the structure was for each student to understand the interpretation the 'ulama took of the Qur'an and the example set by the Prophet. From that teaching, the students were expected to complete the school with a guide for how to live an ethical and moral life, by which they would serve as the example to those they sought to advise.<sup>30</sup>

The format of the school's administration broke molds when compared to that of other forms of learning of the day. Most students around India were taught at home. Those educated elsewhere, particularly in matters of religion, usually studied one written work under a single tutor until that teacher felt the student had mastered the work. The student then would find another teacher to study another reference.<sup>31</sup> From the organizational structure imposed by the Mughal rulers, and the educational example provided by British schools, the founders of the Deoband madrasa were able to combine

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<sup>28</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2002) 9.

<sup>29</sup> Barbara Metcalf, "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in Modern India," *Modern Asian Studies* 12, no. 1 (1978) 108-9.

<sup>30</sup> Usha Sanyal, "Generational Changes in the Leadership of the Ahl-e Sunnat Movement in North India during the Twentieth Century," *Modern Asian Studies* 32, no. 3 (July 1998) 637.

<sup>31</sup> Metcalf, 112.

experience to realize their goal of a unified institute of education that could produce a standard learned student from any region of the territory.<sup>32</sup>

This process of acceptance regardless of regional origin posed unique problems for the school's early administrators. Under the traditional system, family-based instruction was governed by familial rules of conduct and hierarchy. The varied family and regional histories of the Deoband students required a new system of rules to apply to everyone. One of the founders, Maulana Muhammad Qasim, drafted eight fundamental principles for the initial members to follow so that the integration of students and teachers was focused on education and not on familiar or regional ranking. Departments were formed to address different areas of student concern, such as appropriate behavior and discipline, official school judicial opinion, and the proscribed course of instruction. Even the teachers were required to put aside their differences of opinion to allow their peers and students to express opposing views.<sup>33</sup>

The Deoband madrasa set an enduring standard for its sources of funding as well. While some schools of the era simply formed and ran under funds already possessed by a region or a group, those funds eventually ran out, causing the schools to close as a result. Instead, all those associated with Deoband were required to solicit and encourage gifts of money or goods – such as books, food and furnishings – in exchange for recognition from the school. While the students and faculty went about their tasks of securing these donations, the message of the school was spread around the regions as a result. Consequently, the influence of the school and the donations from around the regions built upon each other, until the Deoband madrasa was well known, well respected, and well financed. This method proved so successful in the success of the school that it became the standard by which other madrasas gained funding.<sup>34</sup>

Graduates of the successful Deoband program exemplified the founders' visions during the years following their attendance. The processes of intellectual debate and discussion the students practiced with each other – strangers at first, but always with someone of a differing opinion – taught the students valuable interpersonal skills that

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<sup>32</sup> Metcalf, 112-13.

<sup>33</sup> Metcalf, 113, 115.

<sup>34</sup> Metcalf, 115-16.

carried into the political and professional environments. Several students excelled in municipal management positions, and served as a single, consistent source of appropriate Islamic practice.<sup>35</sup> The influence of the school on the surrounding population was a significant step in the evolution of Islamic political movements in northern India. The very emphasis of the course of study at Deoband, Hadith, recounted and spread to the population, then influenced the views of Indian Muslims of the region. This led to a greater emphasis on stressing Hadith in society in the decades to follow.<sup>36</sup> The idea of a centralized and structured school for the teaching and discussion of all of Islam proved so popular that by 1900, approximately 25 madrasas of the Deobandi tradition were established.<sup>37</sup>

Part of the influence is still evident in today's Pakistan. The Deobandi madrasa stresses that Muslims have all the guidance for life they should want in the Qur'an and Hadith. This has been interpreted by today's Deobandis – about 15 percent of Pakistan's Muslim population – that anything specifically excluded from these documents is therefore not allowed. Technology is shunned, and so labeled as a way for the West to try to oppress Muslims. In 1998, Deobandi Talibs began a campaign to close video rental stores and electronics retail shops in Balochistan. Televisions, VCRs and satellite dishes were burned in the Northwest Frontier Province in 2000.<sup>38</sup> This is quite an evolution from the school that instituted the earliest modern experiment in free and open academic debate nearly 150 years ago.

## **2. Aligarh**

In addition to the Deoband madrasa's products and influence, the format of the school itself stood as an inspiration for further development of organized institutions of study and debate. Where Deoband gave students a base in fundamentals of thinking and Islamic interpretation, the Anglo-Muhammadan College in Aligarh was founded in the 1870s by Sayyed Ahmad Khan to provide Muslim students the education and skills to succeed as Muslims and professionals in the Western style of government established in

<sup>35</sup> Metcalf, 112-15.

<sup>36</sup> Metcalf, 117-18,

<sup>37</sup> Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Contestations*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 268.

<sup>38</sup> Bennett Jones, 9-10.

India by the British. After the fall of the Mughals to the British influence, Muslims began to lose their prominence in Indian society. Business and governance were conducted in English, and positions at English schools were filled most often by Hindus of a society who could afford it. Khan's intent included his vision that the best way for Indian Muslims to succeed in the new Indian society was to maintain a Muslim identity, but to acquire a Western education. A university that covered both of these elements of Indian Muslim needs proved the surest way to achieve this goal.<sup>39-40</sup> Although yet another institution was established at Lucknow under the same pretense as Aligarh, the Nadwat al-'Ulama madrasa would not attain the same notoriety in the formation of the subcontinent following independence from British rule. Aligarh would prove to be more than just an institution of higher training and learning. Its alumni and faculty remained closely associated with the school, an environment that fostered active discussions about the future and politics of the state.

### **3. Bareilly**

A combination of the previous movements can be found in the results of the Barelwi tradition, and its accompanying madrasa in Bareilly. A Sufi tradition of Islam was developed into a guided tradition by Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921). Ahmad Riza called his group the Ahl-e Sunnat wa Jama'at, for "people of the [prophetic] way and the [majority] community,"<sup>41</sup> a name taken from the Sunni identity of "people of the [prophetic] sunna and the majority."<sup>42</sup> The reference to the Sunni identity comes from Ahmed Khan's Sunni religion, though other Sunnis reject his brand of Islam – particularly its Sufi origins – and choose to distance themselves simply by referring to the tradition as "Barelwi."<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, about 60 percent of Muslims in Pakistan today identify themselves with this tradition.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the tradition must have some element that speaks to so many people to have survived and succeeded until today.

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<sup>39</sup> Wolpert, 250-3.

<sup>40</sup> Sanyal, 637.

<sup>41</sup> Sanyal, 635.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid*

<sup>43</sup> *ibid*

<sup>44</sup> Bennett Jones, 11.

The Barelwi tradition (as it will be called herein for simplicity) was developed from the written works of Ahmad Riza. From a very young age, Ahmad Riza had been told by his grandfather – himself a sufi and a jurisconsult – and other ‘ulama from the village, that Ahmad Riza would grow to become a great Muslim scholar. Although his late childhood coincided with the establishment of the madrasa at Deoband, Ahmad Riza was schooled at home by his father.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, Ahmad Riza may be lucky to have received his education at home, since Maulana Rashid Ahmad, one of the original founders of the Deoband madrasa, did not believe in teaching “rational sciences” at the school.<sup>46</sup>

As a result of an extensive and dedicated education from home, Ahmad Riza was considered a talented scholar, especially in Islamic law, as well as logic and math, while still a young man. The interesting point about the tradition that emerged from Ahmad Riza’s thoughts is that first he acquired a following, and eventually a school was founded later in his life.<sup>47</sup> The madrasas at Deoband and Aligarh, although created on the principles of their scholarly founders, first began teaching students, and later became centers of influence. This led to another difference in the movements: the bases of the Deoband and Aligarh movements were students who came to learn at the institutions, eventually growing to adults who could continue to spread that influence. Early followers of Barelwi were educated, upper-middle- to upper-class men. A further distinction lies in their methods for attracting their first followers. The madrasas called residents to the schools, and later used print and word of mouth to spread the message of their respective institutions. Residents of nearby towns came to Ahmad Riza for guidance based on his reputation, regardless of the availability of other sufi pirs close by.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, the teachings of Ahmad Riza that made his brand of Sufism unique centered on his view that a true Muslim must develop a personal relationship with the Prophet if his or her daily acts of faith were to account for anything. Further, it seems his

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<sup>45</sup> Sanyal, 635-37.

<sup>46</sup> Metcalf, 118.

<sup>47</sup> Sanyal, 637.

<sup>48</sup> Sanyal, 638.

beliefs of the Prophet can be compared to the way in which many Christians view Jesus. A belief that the Prophet was made aware of all knowledge, but instructed by Allah not to reveal certain things; that the Prophet was not just a man, but infallible and casting no shadow; that a believer must go through the Prophet if he wants to get to Allah, as a Christian believes that no one can get to God except through Jesus.<sup>49</sup> Of course, as a sufi, Ahmad Riza agreed with the intervention of saints and pirs on behalf of the souls of Muslims – a belief that matches Catholicism – and referenced several works of previous scholars when making these assertions. This principle illustrates a distinct separation between the Deoband from the Bareilly tradition: Deobandi interpretation strictly acknowledges that the Prophet was only a human. Any reference likening Muhammad to God is against Islam, therefore blasphemous.<sup>50</sup>

#### **D. INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE TO POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT**

The impact that these schools had on the Muslim society of British India in the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century is telling, particularly in the way in which the madrasa at Deoband was a way to normalize the thinking and views of the community of Muslims in such a large area. These schools became the most significant, accepted source of interpretation and influence of Islam for several generations of Muslim families during this period. Therefore, it is little wonder that the schools evolved into tools of mobilization for political causes with any ties to religious practice, freedoms, or jurisprudence.

This trend of political influence soon produced many examples illustrating the ease in which such a powerful mobilization tool could overcome the power of the leaders, once the momentum for a cause had begun. One cause in particular was a movement of the Muslims in India against oppression in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries: the Khilafat Movement. It is perhaps in the outgoing and charismatic natures of its leaders, brothers Shaukat and Muhammad Ali, that both ensured the cause to be taken and to be pushed to its political limits. The background of the Ali brothers nurtured more than ignited the natural tendencies of the men to throw them so whole-heartedly into a cause

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<sup>49</sup> Sanyal, 641-42.

<sup>50</sup> Sanyal, 640-42.

for which there was neither success nor widespread support possible. However, the final destination their cause would find was vastly different than the goals the brothers set forth to achieve, due in large part to the overwhelming momentum that religious fervor moves and unites the masses.

### **1. The Turks and the Muslims**

Part of the significance of the Khilafat Movement and its players is the understanding of the regional political environment in which it was allowed to flourish. What the Ali brothers in particular did not understand was that the cause for which they lobbied so diligently was not the outcome desired by those Muslims looking to break from Ottoman influence.

The authority of the Ottoman Empire as a caliph was actually a matter of question to some, though to others it was a matter of divine right. In writing about the differences between Arabs and Turks in 1917, J.F. Scheltema wrote that besides the ethnic differences between the two groups, no Arab had reason to recognize the Turkish claim as a caliphate, and therefore had never viewed the Ottomans as such. The empire was allowed to rule over the Hijaz for the simple reasons that it had gained control by power of might, and that ultimately the empire's reach could not easily stretch to the lands of Mecca and Medina; in fact, real control of the land was left to be fought over by area families.<sup>51</sup>

However, Leonard Binder writes that the ulama accorded Ottoman rulers legitimacy by way of their loyalty, rising to a respected position in the court in return. The authority of the sultan as the conqueror then justified his claim as the head of Islam, as the protector of the holy sites. The ulama refused to abandon their interpretation of Islamic law, which was irrefutable.<sup>52</sup> Naturally, both interpretations have their merits, and the Ottoman sultanate controlled the lands of Hijaz with little opposition from outside the empire.

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<sup>51</sup> J.F. Scheltema, "Arabs and Turks." *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 37 (1917) 154-5.

<sup>52</sup> Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), 19-21.

In a similar way, the Mughals of India tried to legitimize their empire as a caliphate. Rulers in Delhi were recognized by the caliphs in Baghdad and Cairo, and in return swore their allegiance to the Abbasids. They sustained their legitimacy until the British East India Company eventually gained control of the subcontinent in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, although some subordinate princes established relations with the Ottoman caliph directly. These roots established for centuries between the Muslims of India and the role of the Ottoman sultan as the true caliphate grew deep, particularly once Mughal rule of India ended, leaving the Ottoman sultan as the only possible purveyor of Islam.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, the absolution of the caliphate should cause such activism in colonial India, at a time when Muslims were dealing with oppression and the inferiority of the political power of their religion.

## **2. Mobilization from Academia**

The movement for Muslim political unity between the World Wars follows similar characteristics as many political activist campaigns in the United States in the 1960s and '70s: a strong mobilization stemmed from the universities. The university at Aligarh was established by Sayyed Ahmad Khan in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century to modernize the Muslim youth with the tools they needed to compete in the colonized British India. The early classes of graduates from the university at Aligarh exemplified the value of the Muslim university education by remaining active leaders as university trustees and prominent men of their societies.<sup>54</sup> By the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Aligarh had emerged as the nerve center of Muslim politics. Aligarh leaders mobilized the population easily, usually in the name of the Indian Muslim as a permanent interest in national politics.<sup>55</sup> Two of these graduate leaders were brothers Shaukat and Mohammad Ali.

Early education at Bareilly and the institutions and influence of Aligarh College instilled in the Ali brothers that Indian Muslims had fallen from the leadership they once had, and that they could rally under the communal spirit of Aligarh College to regain that glory. The ideology of Sayyid Ahmad Khan inspired them to try to bring together the

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<sup>53</sup> Binder, 4-5.

<sup>54</sup> Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. (Columbia University Press, New York, 1982) 14-16.

<sup>55</sup> David Lelyveld, "Three Aligarh Students: Aftab Ahmad Khan, Ziauddin Ahmad and Muhammad Ali." *Modern Asian Studies* 9, no. 2 (1975) 228.



whole Indian Muslim community.<sup>56</sup> After their graduation from Aligarh, the Ali brothers each found work in the public sector, but each also continued to support the college. In the early 1900s, Mohammad wrote in the *Times of London* supporting Aligarh.<sup>57</sup> He also engaged in political activity, writing in opposition to the British rule in India.<sup>58</sup>

Muhammad and Shaukat Ali became much more serious in politics in 1907. Shaukat Ali competed with his former classmate Aftab Ahmad Khan. To counter Aftab's influence, the brothers established a parallel organization, complete with a publication.<sup>59</sup> The new association resulted in an increased alumni membership of 1912 nearly four times the membership in 1907.<sup>60</sup> This experience kept the Ali brothers closer to Aligarh and its influence, the one common goal they shared with Aftab. Their differences, however, led the brothers to envision expansion not only of the university's scope, but of the political ideology they had learned there.

In the meantime, another organization in which the brothers would participate and which would influence their political activism was established, also holding its headquarters at Aligarh. One key issue of the All-Indian Muslim League, inspired by the ideology of Aligarh, was that though it formed for the promotion of Muslim participation and representation in the government, it did so under a pro-British platform. Muhammad identified with this vision, in that ideologically he was strongly Muslim, though politically he supported Indian nationalism.<sup>61</sup>

### **3. Indian Muslim Politics**

The activities surrounding Aligarh notwithstanding, politics for the average Muslim in India under British rule caused hardships and created a rift in Hindu-Muslim relations. Although no British plan existed for favoritism of one group over another, when political power is left unchecked – especially at the lowest levels – personal interests and desires make their way into the framework. The united provinces of India could not

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<sup>56</sup> Lelyveld, 240.

<sup>57</sup> Minault, 17.

<sup>58</sup> Lelyveld, 237.

<sup>59</sup> Lelyveld, 237.

<sup>60</sup> Minault, 17.

<sup>61</sup> Minault, 18-19.

avoid such misuses, which caused a major rift in sectarian relationships throughout the nation.

By 1910, decentralization was instituted for the municipal governance system in India. The abuses of the system were addressed, including a standardized tax code, and guaranteed electorates for Muslims in some areas, although Hindu sectarianism still prevailed in others. Within six years, the central government conceded separate representation.<sup>62</sup> At the same time, Muslims were looking to regain their share of the power in India, from the national government down to the provinces and municipalities.<sup>63</sup> Ultimately, Muslims felt as if they needed to use the control they had in local government positions to safeguard the future of their religion and their religious society.<sup>64</sup> The political influence of Aligarh College was brought to bear, with Sayyed Ahmad Khan personally, and the Aligarh political machine collectively, including the Muslim League, working against this imbalance.<sup>65</sup>

Among these sectarian political battles, the Khilafat Movement found its beginnings. The First World War forced the Ali brothers to split from the Muslim League to take on a new mission. The League had been established and continued to operate under the vision that all of India should be united under British rule, but that Indians of all religions should have representation. The promulgation of Islam, on the other hand, led the brothers to adopt a pro-Turkey stance, since the Ottoman sultanate was the last symbol of Islamic unity as a recognized caliphate. When the Ottoman Empire began to intimate anti-British leanings in early 1914, the Alis had to make a choice. Muhammad Ali tried to keep the nations of his two loyalties together, first by arranging for messages to the Turkish foreign minister and the caliph, urging them to maintain a neutral stance during the war, then by publishing articles outlining the justification for Turkish dissatisfaction with the British Empire. By the end of the year, however, Turkey and Great Britain were at war, and the colonial government could not afford to have established pro-Turkey politicians among the population at-large. The

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<sup>62</sup> Robinson, 416-30.

<sup>63</sup> Francis Robinson, "Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces, 1883-1916." *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3. (1973) 389.

<sup>64</sup> Robinson, 413.

<sup>65</sup> Robinson, 414.

Alis and several other activists like them were then interned, and eventually incarcerated, for the remainder of the war.<sup>66</sup>

#### **4. The Khilafat Movement**

By the time of the Ali brothers' release from prison, the Muslim League was involved with several political issues. The issue of the Turkish Caliphate was one, but it wasn't the most important on the League's agenda. Eventually, the Muslim League made the Britain-Turkey debate a frontline issue. Although the League remained loyal to Great Britain on political grounds, members clearly felt that the Caliphate issue was of a serious personal nature to Indian Muslims. The unique issue here, however, is that though the Khilafat Movement was initiated as a matter of future Muslim security, its anti-British nature made it a key issue to unite Indians for their fight for independence from the British Empire.<sup>67-68</sup> The ultimate deciding factor would be the way in which this political opposition was waged.

The Ali brothers finally had their say during a convention of the Congress, the League, the All-Indian Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat al-Ulama in December of 1919. Shaukat Ali led the Khilafat Committee session, from which came a resolution to defy the government in order to defend Islam, should the government enact peace terms with Turkey that were counter to Islamic tenant. The weakness of this resolution, however, was its ambiguity of the actions the members would take should such a peace agreement be made.<sup>69</sup>

From this point on, the Ali brothers led the charge for the Khilafat Movement. They represented the movement in meetings with the viceroy in India and to leaders in England. Their campaign and popularity spread throughout India, as the representatives of the voice for the survival of Islam. As the movement claimed to speak for the caliphate as the defender of all Islam, the Alis presumed to represent all Muslims, not just those in India. The implication was that Great Britain could count on their support in the settlement of disagreements in other Muslim lands, though neither brother understood the

<sup>66</sup> Minault, 50-51.

<sup>67</sup> Minault, 62-64.

<sup>68</sup> Houghton, 552.

<sup>69</sup> Minault, 82-83.

situation in Arab countries. In arguing for all Ottoman Muslims to remain under caliph control, Muhammad Ali was in essence asking for the Arabs to remain under the rule of the Turks.<sup>70</sup>

Eventually the momentum achieved by the Khilafat movement had little chance to succeed in the goal for which it was begun, and it is here that the religious fervor that began the movement was diverted to a slightly different political goal. Realizing that the Khilafat Committee's goal of the sultanate retaining power was slipping away in Turkey, Muhammad Ali began to limit his comments to the desires of Muslims in India. Gandhi's non-cooperation plan was taking hold all over India, and producing its desired results against the British. Muhammad extended this plan to apply to Muslims, couching his call in the form of a *jihad* – if the British would not enhance Muslim influence, then the Muslims must commit to the Indian plan to secure the power for themselves.<sup>71</sup> While maintaining a religious goal, the momentum of the movement was shifted to cater to whatever Muhammad Ali chose.

Ultimately, Muhammad's shift from Turkish goals to Indian goals secured his status as a leader in India. By the end of 1920, the Ottoman Empire retired to its permanent place in the history books. Instead of accepting defeat, Muhammad simply modified the group's goals. He continued his rhetoric on the survival of Islam under a caliphate, but switched the focus on the strength of Islam in India.<sup>72</sup> With the change of focus to the plight of Muslims in India, the Ali brothers found their niche. The earlier focus on the future of the Turkish Caliphate really only served to mobilize support and create a bond that all Muslims could be convinced to join, but the movement ended as a political force that guaranteed continued political influence of its leaders. From this, society came to accept the practice of politicians rallying support for their *political* aspirations under the guise of the survival of the *faith* of Islam. This practice would evolve into the idea that any element of political life that specifically did not reference the promulgation of faith, could be labeled as policies against the spiritual aspects of Islam. Essentially, if a policy is not written to promote spiritual faith, then it is

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<sup>70</sup> Minault, 85-90.

<sup>71</sup> Minault, 90.

<sup>72</sup> Minault, 95-110.

automatically identified as opposing faith. These are the ideals against which modernity struggles.

## **E. MUSLIM SEPARATIST MOVEMENT TO PARTITION**

The partition of India in 1947 serves as the most powerful example of the history that religion and politics, particularly for the mobilization of the population, has been seen as necessary and effective, and has survived throughout Pakistan's existence. Since Pakistan was formed as a home for Muslims, it is reasonable to expect that political parties trying to further the interests of the population would base their platform on the Islamic character of those interests. However, it is the abuse of that religious aspect to further a goal that is really only political that has become the characteristic that is difficult for Musharraf to counter.

The British Cabinet Mission of 1946, sent to India with absolutely no plan of transition, presented an entire governmental structure blueprint only one month after arrival. The Cabinet Mission's goal was to facilitate the transition to self-rule, but with the understanding that the independent India would be a united one. When no agreements could be reached, within two more months, the blueprint was revised, debated and restructured to the point that an entirely different outcome was prescribed.<sup>73</sup>

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It is within this climate, with decisions and proposals changing even before they can be announced or understood, that the many strong and visionary personalities were able to effect small adjustments toward their goals. Their competing goals, however, played off of each other to further the sectarian divide. Congress President Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), needed only to comment in the abstract on the National Congress' ability to amend the agreements as Congress saw fit during the conduct of the Constituent Assembly.<sup>75</sup> His statement may have been simply regarding the composition of the interim government, or he may have intended for the implication of further changes to resonate through the press. Regardless of Nehru's intent, after good-faith negotiation and

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<sup>73</sup> Michael Brecher, "The Cabinet Mission: Nehru's Role," *The Partition of India: Causes and Responsibilities*, T. Walter Wallbank, ed. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1966), 73.

<sup>74</sup> Wolpert, 341.

<sup>75</sup> Maulana Azad, "The Mission Plan Was Practicable," Wallbank, 69.

compromise, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), member of Congress and president of the Muslim League, took Nehru's comments as a sign that Indian Muslims were to be subject to the unchecked whims of a Hindu-majority National Congress once again. Previously, Jinnah had been in opposed to any partition, believing that religious differences would be set aside and all people of India could and should strive for one independent nation. However, Nehru's comments were the final factor that convinced Jinnah that India's sectarian divide could be promulgated by a post-independent Congress, and gave the legitimacy to his later claim that the subcontinent should be divided in order to provide Muslims at least one new nation of their own.<sup>76</sup>

At the same time, a highly educated Muslim journalist, Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979), who had participated in Indian Muslim political movements since the Khilafat Movement, established a slightly different view of political Islam. After a short time as a newspaper editor for the Jamia'at-i Ulama-i Hind, or the Party of the Indian Ulama, Mawdudi set off to launch his own political movement, based on the belief that a strong Muslim political structure would unite Muslims of India, and serve to reinvigorate the practice of Islam among the population. The Jama'at-i Islami was established in 1941, led by Mawdudi until he retired in 1972, and held the premise that the communal Islamic leadership had the responsibility to outline a standard of living and practice to serve as an example to the citizens, thereby creating a tighter, righteous Muslim community. From here, the influence would spread across to Arabia, bringing Muslims back to a more pure way of living and practicing Islam.<sup>77</sup>

The point of this group's establishment at this time, along side the existent Muslim League, and the emphasis on Islamic parties in Pakistan's politics, illustrates the foundation of the intertwined relationship between religion and politics from the creation of Pakistan. The vision of the moderates as it opposed that of these elements for a purely religious future of Pakistan has its origins here. Today, these two political visions still compete for the right to define Pakistan's identity.

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<sup>76</sup> Penderel Moon, "The Cabinet Mission: Doomed from the Outset," Wallerbank, 80.

<sup>77</sup> Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994) 3-9.

## **F. MODERN DAY RELIGIOUS-BASED POLITICAL MOVEMENTS**

Deobandi tradition has been characterized by two identities here. First, as a school of thought that expected and elicited free discussion about interpretations of the Qur'an and the Hadith, as was the case when the school and tradition were founded in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. More recently, its followers have been portrayed more along the path seen in Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia: the violent rejection of all things technological, Western and modern. Both descriptions are accurate, but must be applied to the correct time in history. The drastic shift from one extreme, literally to another, did not happen on its own. The environment of Pakistan and influences from surrounding nations not only played a large part in this change, but affected several other organizations and social movements in similar ways. These events and movements each played off of each other, needing only the smallest nudges by the right personalities to create the state seen today.

Author Michael Griffin provides an excellent illustration of this process. In describing Mullah Mohammad Omar's successful campaign across Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Griffin offers a reason for Omar's success. Although its leaders fought with the mujahedin, the actual fighting force Omar's Taliban militia was comprised of students with little or no battle experience, leaving their strength and potential in question. Many in Kabul discounted the approaching force, thinking it had neither the experience nor the fortitude to attempt a takeover of the seat of government. However, the militia acquired the loyalty of most of the major regions by other means of coercion: tribal leaders were more trusting of the Taliban, as it was a band ethnically the same as the tribes; well-negotiated sums of money were offered; but mostly, as Griffin describes, the Taliban militia gained its popular following by way of a "skilful manipulation of religious intoxication."<sup>78</sup> It was the small adjustments of the way Afghans saw the world that made the final push to Kabul simpler for Omar. First he established a common bond of ethnicity, implying that his goals were their goals. Those who could not relate to Omar on these grounds could be persuaded by the resources to feed and clothe their tribes. Finally, the one element of a person's life that holds the most power is his faith. By tapping that resource of passion that had already been stirred by the previous war, Omar was able to bend Afghan minds to his way of thinking.

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<sup>78</sup> Griffin, 12.

Mullah Omar's campaign should have been very predictable to Kabul and elsewhere. The same influence had been used to raise public and international support for the ferocious war against Soviet invaders in 1979. Indeed, even regional events leading up to the invasion by Soviet forces set a pliable stage for extreme influence, presented very convincingly with religious rhetoric in Islamic costume.

### **1. Pakistan's Domestic Politics – 1971-1977**

The school at Deoband, its alumni, and the subsequent satellite madrasas around Pakistan, were founded on the belief that governments should be questioned and challenged when the needs of the society were not addressed. When Zulfikar Bhutto proved to be more dictator than democrat, he should have anticipated rapid formation of opposition groups. His alienation of the military; the of strong dissenting political personalities; and the disenfranchisement of large sections of the population, simply on the basis of their form of religious practice; set Bhutto up for mass opposition. His continued antics that proved beneficial to him but detrimental to the country provided the motive. Finally in 1977, Bhutto's hunger for power came to a point. Elections were announced, scheduled so Bhutto's plans to consolidate ultimate power to the presidency could be accomplished under a rule-of-law legitimacy.<sup>79</sup>

What Bhutto failed to anticipate was the organization of his political opponents with the single goal of seeing Bhutto out of office. These parties joined their forces, thereby consolidating all opponents of Bhutto, regardless of the issue. This Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) survived the rigged election and its subsequent political fight. Bhutto's efforts to employ the military failed, as its chairman, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, opposed Bhutto for his own reasons. With the full weight of the military behind him, Zia finally agreed to step in to the post that soon was vacated by Bhutto.<sup>80</sup>

The significance of Zia's rise to power in 1977 lies in the basis for his opposition to Bhutto. It was not Bhutto's claims to ultimate authority, or his failed land reform initiatives that offended Zia. Instead, it was what Zia considered Bhutto's decidedly anti-Islamic actions that convinced Zia of Bhutto's failure to Pakistan. From 1977,

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<sup>79</sup> Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, (One World, Oxford: 2003) 145-155

<sup>80</sup> Ziring, 156-160.



Mohammed Zia ul-Haq intended to put Pakistan back on the track of what he considered not just a homeland for Muslims, but an Islamic state.<sup>81</sup>

Once religion was brought back into the mainstream of Pakistani politics, the general direction of the course had been set. Muhammad Qasim Zaman noted in 1998 that for the vulgarly dissenting personality, today's "print culture" provides a ready environment for a perceived or imagined threat to bloom into a newly realized sectarian identity.<sup>82</sup> The drivers who would later steer so many toward religious extremism had only to wait for external influences to narrow the course, and advertise anything that could be interpreted as a threat to the society. Of course, Pakistan's domestic environment comprised of more factors than just religion, but these will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

## **2. External Influences**

Outside of Pakistan, religiously inspired political movements gained even more momentum. The failure of Mohammed Reza Shah's rule in Iran sparked a theocratic rally that evolved into a full revolution by the end of the decade. Soviet influence in Kabul resulted in a massive invasion of Afghanistan. Characteristics of both events are said to have spurred ultra conservative Saudi Arabian Wahhabists to divert extensive wealth to madrasas in Pakistan for the final push of politically active Islam to that of extremist ideology. The only problem is that while this notion is accepted as fact, little evidence can be found to substantiate the claim. In 2001, New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman noted a placard on the wall of the Haqqinaya Madrasa – the school where Omar and many other Taliban leaders studied – that reads simply, "'A gift of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.'"<sup>83</sup> A U.S. Congressional Research Service report also notes that a Saudi Embassy spokesman denies Saudi government support directly to extremist madrasas, as that activity 'goes against our policy.' The report goes on to note, "to date, there are no published reports on the aggregate amount of funding which has been donated from inside Saudi Arabia to specifically support the building of madrasas

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<sup>81</sup> Bennett Jones, 16

<sup>82</sup> Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies* 32, No. 3 (July 1988), 690.

<sup>83</sup> Thomas Friedman, "In Pakistan, It's Jihad 101," *The New York Times*, November 13, 2001.

worldwide.”<sup>84</sup> Essentially, the support is considered common knowledge, but details of this support – such as the extent of funding or influence over curricula – cannot be verified.

Zaman adds, however, that the success of a madrasa, usually closely associated with a strictly defined sectarian organization, spurs the establishment of more such institutions; thereby perpetuating the sectarian ideology within its own momentum. He also notes that the growth of such madrasas in Pakistan is coincidentally linked to sectarian conflict.<sup>85</sup>

A large number of madrasas in Pakistan today label themselves Deobandi, because of historic links to the original Dar al-Ulum madrasa in Deoband. As noted before, this tradition saw the birth of approximately 25 new schools within 50 years of the parent institution. In the more than 100 years since, however, separate movements under the Deobandi identity umbrella have developed, until the term “Deobandi” has come to represent a strict, narrowly interpreted extreme form of Sunni – not exactly the open, Sufi-dominated force in free discussion of the original school.<sup>86</sup>

Another influence on this trend of Islamic political mobilization was the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). Former Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin provided a radically understated foreshadow of the Islamic resistance to Soviet influence in Afghanistan when, in March 1979, he told Afghan communist heavyweight Nur Mohammed Taraki that “Afghanistan’s rising Islamic rebellion... presented ‘a complex political international issue.’”<sup>87</sup> This proved true not only for the Soviet Union, but the echoes of resounding in the aftermath of the movement would affect dozens of countries, Muslim and otherwise, for several decades.

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<sup>84</sup> Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues,” Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 2006.

<sup>85</sup> Zaman, 690.

<sup>86</sup> Gilles Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present*, (New York: Columbia, 2005), 277-78.

<sup>87</sup> Boris Gromov, “Limited Contingent,” *Progress* (Moscow, 1994), from transcript, translated and published by Cold War International History Project, George Washington University (Washington, D.C.), as reprinted in Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (London: Penguin, 2005), 42.

Kosygin may have anticipated the powerful draw Islam would have over the citizens of Afghanistan, but the country's tribal history gave little clue. Although three previous attempts to conquer Afghanistan ultimately failed, the predominant force seemed to be tribal conflict. What Moscow could not imagine was that regardless of deep-seeded tribal conflict, Islam was the one element that could unite Afghans against an invader – especially one that espoused atheism. The adjacent Islamic revolution in Iran certainly added fuel to the fire of resistance.<sup>88</sup>

Said Amir Arjomand quotes political theorist Max Weber to describe the tension between the state and the hierarchy: “Since political power claims a competing charisma of its own, it may be made to appear as the work of Satan.”<sup>89</sup>

Barbara Metcalf writes that “the Taliban emerged as a local power in Afghanistan starting in 1994 because they were able to provide protection and stability in a context of warlordism, raping, and corruption.”<sup>90</sup> Once the Soviet threat was conquered, tribal factions divided Afghanistan again. The only way to establish a stable, unified Afghanistan was to go back to the one thing with which almost every Afghan could identify: Islam. It was the one element that made Omar the most credible, allowing his campaign across Afghanistan to take hold and succeed. In war-weary Afghanistan, the people were simply too tired of war and conflict to worry about the details.

The Afghan-Soviet War had special implications for Pakistan. Iran not only was busy with its own revolution, but it was a Shi'a revolution. The majority of Afghans were Sunni, as were most Pakistanis. Many Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan, flooding border-area madrasas with Afghan students and straining Pakistani infrastructure. Additionally, as the United States had convinced Saudi Arabia to contribute as much money to the ousting of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Saudi Wahhabists found their niche in the rapidly growing enrollment of the Deobandi madrasas of Pakistan. It was easy for Zia to influence these madrasas for the 11 years of his rule, eventually turning their teaching of Islam into one closer to his radical brand. It

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<sup>88</sup> Dorronsoro, 106.

<sup>89</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. (University of California Press, 1978), as reprinted in Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 75.

<sup>90</sup> Metcalf (2004), 277.

was then an easy jump from there to the Wahhabi influence coming in to harvest this crop of new graduates for the Afghan jihad.<sup>91</sup> The shared identity and religious ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan identified at the beginning of the war would bind the two countries together for two more decades.

## **G. CONCLUSION**

At least one consideration must be made when analyzing attempts at modernization and enlightenment of Muslim nations today. The Westphalia model cannot be used as a template, to be followed exactly, hoping for successful transition. Too many variables are changed: close interaction with and influence by many different cultures around the world have made the environment markedly different from that of Renaissance Europe; and the cultural histories of areas and peoples such as those in Southwest Asia immediately ensure that changes must come in different packages, over long periods of time, if they are expected to take hold. The distinct separation of religion and politics was appropriate and effective for Western societies, but has proven disastrous for Muslim countries. If this single issue is accepted, and a new way to modernity can be realized with politics and religion influencing societies together, then the question becomes how to achieve a successful parallel relationship while preventing the misuse of religious motivation for the purpose of political gain.

Historically, the line dividing religious commitment and political hijacking has been thin, and the influence needed to move a population from one goal to another was slight. Though very short-lived in its influence, the Khilafat Movement would not have been the force in mobilization had it not been for the charismatic leadership of Muhammad and Shaukat Ali. Unfortunately, the cause of the Ottoman Caliphate was merely a symbol behind which the movement mobilized, but it did rally the Muslims of all parts of India to join the political process in the security of their future rights. In the struggle for independence from British rule, regardless of the outcome, influences of the Bareilly and Deoband madrasas, Aligarh University, and religiously based political

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<sup>91</sup> Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005).

movements such as the Khilafat Movement, the tie between Islam and political mobilization found its roots.

The most significant result of the Khilafat Movement in the politics of the everyday Muslim of the Indian subcontinent was to establish the idea that any political campaign could be waged if the slightest connection could be drawn to the differing opinions of religious identity. The masses can be mobilized for the furtherance of a political goal if they believe that goal will counter any perceived injustice, or even to counter a difference of religious interpretation. Unfortunately, this form of mass mobilization opens the door for widespread misuse. With the very personal place that religion holds in most people, emotion often becomes the driving factor over reason, giving way for unethical, corrupt or simply unqualified leadership to gain power.

Compounding this sectarian political mobilization was the ultimate partition of India following the departure of the British in 1947. For several decades, Hindu and Muslim groups had used their religious differences as excuses for varied political gains. The final act was the establishment of a separate Muslim nation. Although the establishment of Pakistan for its founder was simply to ensure religious freedom without fear of political oppression, the idea of Pakistan evolved into the ideology that Pakistan was created to establish an Islamic state; yet another instance of cashing in power garnered by the propaganda of faith in attempts to gain power in the ruling government.

This legitimacy of mobilization was strengthened further by a war several decades later between Muslims of Afghanistan, reinforced with religiously motivated fighters from these madrasas and their alumni from surrounding countries, against the armies of the Soviet Union. The popular momentum that ensued was fueled by a decade of “righteous” rhetoric touting the defenders of Islam, facilitated the growth of anti-communist sentiment as well. This provided the unique scenario for opportunistic, radical religious personalities to bend the paths of the religious population and the school system established to promote religious debate, to a path of extremism, and the misuse of religion for the attainment of power.

Well before the idea of Pakistan existed, the harmonious weaving of religion and politics was easily misused and eventually warped to the hijacking of religious

commitment for political power. With so much altruistic intent, intermixed with such a corruption, the people of Pakistan have come to see the lines blurred when religion is used for social mobilization. As Musharraf tries to counter the negative political misuse of religion, he has to take great care not to appear to be oppressing entirely religious participation in governance. It took more than 150 years to establish such a system, so to correct its path will also take some time. Were this the only negative issue, a simple plan may be devised at least to set Pakistan on a path toward moderation with little effort. However, this is but one aspect of the issue. Other very strong forces are in play, which make Enlightened Moderation a long, uphill battle.

### **III. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON PAKISTAN DOMESTIC CHARACTERISTICS AND POLITICS: THE CASES OF INDIA, SAUDI ARABIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE UNITED STATES**

“The prospect of a nuclear-armed Pakistan adopting the credo of the Taliban, while unlikely, is simply too risky to ignore.” – Zalmay Khalilzad<sup>92</sup>

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In the study of International Relations, interaction between two states is usually observed only in the vacuum of the bilateral relationship, with little or only token reference to the influence of other actors on the system as a whole. The same can be said when looking at the influence that a nation’s interactions have had on its domestic politics and society. The influences of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia on each other’s political paths are at times intertwined – the relationship between two often affected a third, and sometimes fourth. In one chaotic example – the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces – all four of these nations, plus several others, were directly involved in each other’s domestic environments so closely that it can be difficult to separate one nation’s influence over another’s. Additionally, the United States at times has exerted geo-political influence on Pakistan, though the effects have been less direct.

In order to understand the environment in which Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharraf must work in his goal for successful economic and social development in Pakistan, a look at Pakistan’s neighborhood and its international influences is essential. These relationships not only have shaped the landscape of Pakistan’s domestic character; they continue to influence the way in which Pakistani society reacts to domestic change. The four countries that have affected Pakistan most notably since its creation have been its neighbors India and Afghanistan; regional power Saudi Arabia; and the last global superpower, the United States. Going back to the sake of simplicity, however, the influences of these four states on the domestic environment of Pakistan will be addressed separately in general, with allowances made for other sources of influence.

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<sup>92</sup> Steven Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 551.

## B. INDIA

Regardless of any other alliances or relationships Pakistan does or must maintain, one neighbor nation always stays at the forefront of Pakistan's foreign policy. The issues that have gone unresolved since Pakistan's split from India have festered, and have led to further issues between the two nations. Unresolved territorial disputes, the division of government assets and the tragic memories from the mass migration of hundreds of millions of citizens remain in the minds Pakistani citizens and government leaders. Walter Anderson opined that contemporary Indian foreign policy is drafted under the pretext that India is seen predominantly in the context of the Indo-Pakistani relationship, illustrating the close influence India and Pakistan have had on each other's history.<sup>93</sup> In the simple words of Stephen Philip Cohen, "From the Indian perspective, negotiations with Pakistan will always be difficult."<sup>94</sup> This sentiment is equally applicable for Pakistan's perspective of India. Additionally, the history between the two countries is easily accessed, keeping India's impact on Pakistani society negative, regardless of any progress.<sup>95</sup>

Relations between India and Pakistan – indeed relations between any two countries – are not exclusive in the affects the two nations have on each other. Issues between India and Pakistan are impacted by each nation's relations with other countries. A case in point is that of China's impact on Indo-Pakistan relations. China and India have engaged in continuous opposition over the subject of border identification for much of their histories. When China gained nuclear weapons capability, India set out to develop one of its own. Once India successfully tested a nuclear weapon in 1974, both China and Pakistan placed Indian relations at a higher priority, each for their own disagreements with India. China saw Pakistan as a mutual adversary to India at the time,

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<sup>93</sup> Walter Anderson, "Recent Trends in Indian Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey* 41, no. 5 (September-October 2001), 776.

<sup>94</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 88.

<sup>95</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 46.



therefore China agreed to help once Pakistan stepped up its efforts to develop its own nuclear technology.<sup>96</sup>

In the same light, Pakistan's assistance to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion put India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union into neat categories, where Southwest Asia nations fell into camps supported either by the Soviet Union or United States. Afghanistan and Pakistan were on the side of the Americans, while India was seen by the West on the side of the Soviets.<sup>97</sup> This simple identification of India and Pakistan on opposite sides of an international struggle set the stage for subsequent international alliances to be seen from the beginning in particular relief.

An interesting theory on the effects India has on Pakistan's domestic environment is the claim that Pakistan needs its distrust of India to unite Pakistanis around a common goal. Mismanagement or delays in the division of state assets at Partition, as well as the conflicts surrounding Kashmir and later Bangladesh are issues that politicians can readily access to support efforts to rally Pakistanis for government support.<sup>98</sup> However, two wars with India since Partition – 1965 and 1971 – as well as an uprising in Kashmir, emphasize that the problems between the neighbors have yet gone unresolved.

Due to their shared history and heritage, tensions between these two countries are heightened. Similarities in daily living and cultural traditions make India and Pakistan natural rivals – each wanting to establish itself as a separate and distinguishable entity apart from the other. The differing characteristics of the two governments is especially of note; the way in which Pakistan's governance has evolved – strong military involvement and governmental decisiveness – can make the government in New Delhi feel encumbered by a more structured and bureaucratic process. However, this very process under which India operates is exactly what keeps its identity relatively stable.

The most recent, and the most salient, case in point was illustrated during what became known as the Kargil crisis. India found itself in a unique position when general elections failed to produce a working government in 1999, leaving the presidency in

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<sup>96</sup> Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, *India, Pakistan and the United States: Breaking with the Past* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997), 3-4.

<sup>97</sup> Tahir-Kheli, 2.

<sup>98</sup> Cohen (2001), 204-5.

place, but with no parliament to ratify its decisions. This “caretaker government” was bound by the same article of India’s constitution, stating that a president could only decide policy when backed by the parliament.<sup>99</sup> While Indian political leaders felt that the stability of the system could allow for this unexpected development, one eventuality with India’s natural rival challenged India’s perceptions.

Earlier that year, in February 1999, then-Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee traveled to Lahore to meet with Nawaz Sharif for a political summit, in an attempt to open discussions on some of the issues that had kept Indo-Pakistani relations tense. The summit faced criticism from many sides, including factions that denounced both leaders’ participation. Religious-based parties such as Jama’at-i Islami and Jamiat-i Ulama-i Islam felt that poor Indian treatment of Kashmiris made Vajpayee’s participation false; and Sharif’s participation too conciliatory to India.<sup>100</sup>

Despite the opposition, the summit seemed to give most citizens some hope that the two nations might move toward resolutions at least to some of their differences. Unfortunately, the progress made in public opinion was dashed when the Indian government was struggling to reform later that year, and forces backed by Pakistan crossed the Line of Control to occupy Indian-held territory in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. India responded with decisive force, but kept the battlefield limited to the section in Kargil directly affected by the intrusion. While the crisis lasted only a few months, more than 1,000 deaths were reported on both sides. It was not until the United States pressured Sharif to move Pakistani troops back across the Line of Control.<sup>101</sup>

Besides the conflict itself, several other elements of this crisis proved unsettling to New Delhi. First, that the decision to expel the intrusion in Kashmir could not be made so easily, despite the establishment of seemingly specialized organization of government functions. The newly established National Security Council had yet to feel its authority enough to act without Parliament, and the National Integration Council also could have taken the lead to devise an appropriate response, but its exclusion only served to highlight

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<sup>99</sup> Devesh Kapur, “India in 1999,” *Asian Survey* 40, no. 1 (January-February 2000), 195-7.

<sup>100</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, “Pakistan in 2000: Starting Anew or Stalemate?” *Asian Survey* 41, no. 1 (January-February 2001), 107-8.

<sup>101</sup> Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” *Asian Survey* 41, no. 6 (November-December 2001), 1071-2.

a political trend to defer to the highest authority – in this case the unformed government.<sup>102</sup> While India's bureaucratic governmental system should instill confidence in its stability, the Kargil crisis instilled jealousy that Pakistan's more flexible governing system – though unstable and ever-changing – could move so much more quickly on issues of national importance.<sup>103</sup> The coup that found Musharraf in the office of the chief executive did not reduce Indian concerns over the governance issue. While Sharif was credited with the responsibility of the incursion at Kargil, Musharraf is seen as the military leader who planned, and likely instigated the operation. Any plans Musharraf presents to India with regard to the solution to the Kashmir problem, therefore, is looked on with the same suspicion of hypocrisy as Vajpayee was accused at the Lahore summit.<sup>104</sup>

Of all issues remaining between India and Pakistan, the most lasting and seemingly most contentious is this case of Kashmir. No Pakistani political leader has dared to offer a compromise for fear of losing the support of Muslims in Kashmir, particularly fearing violent opposition of militant extremists.<sup>105</sup> As noted previously, even attempts to cool tensions are met with criticism and skepticism, along with lingering issues of distrust between the governments over the motivation of any overtures.

Besides the perpetuation of distrust between the two nations, the wars, smaller military actions, and several separate incidents in Kashmir have produced one consequence that India has used to its advantage. Alexander Evans wrote in 2002, "The threat of force against Pakistan can deliver diplomatic dividends for India."<sup>106</sup> If the Kargil incident proved anything, it was that outside political pressures, not Indian force, resulted in the withdrawal of Pakistani forces. Evans' observation also came after India had tried in 2001 to work out its own deals with militant organizations in Pakistan-controlled areas of Kashmir. When cease-fire agreements with Hizb ul-Mujahideen failed to produce results, thereby disproving Evans' point, India announced it would revert to its previous stance of offensive action in the region. India also tried to use the

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<sup>102</sup> Kapur, 197.

<sup>103</sup> Sagan, 1072.

<sup>104</sup> Kapur, 205.

<sup>105</sup> Cohen (2004), 51-4.

<sup>106</sup> Alexander Evans, "India Flexes its Muscles," *Foreign Policy* 130 (May-June 2002), 95.

political arena to soften its image with regard to Pakistan by arranging a meeting with Musharraf. While the visit worked wonders for Musharraf's position on the international stage, India was left with little to show for its efforts.<sup>107</sup> Ultimately, it was the activities of al Qaeda later in the same year that gave India its chance to show itself as the polar opposite of Pakistan in order to garner favor from the West; as well as the chance to show the United States that India was its strategic partner in the region, thereby opening the door for further relations between India and the West.

Although some suggest that Pakistanis make more of Indian hostility than actually exists, the immediate reaction of India following the attacks on the United States in 2001 indicate that India was at the end of its proverbial rope with regard to international options. India quickly seized the opportunity to divert some international attention to Pakistan-based terrorism, particularly in Pakistan-controlled regions of Kashmir, where al Qaeda was alleged to have established training camps. The time Indian officials spent in Kashmir with Hizb ul-Mujahideen earlier in the year would have provided just enough evidence to support this claim. Additionally, India was quick to offer use of its bases to the United States for the purpose of launching attacks against the Taliban.<sup>108</sup> Additionally, India took the further step to paint a picture of Pakistan that matched that of the Taliban government.<sup>109</sup>

Two events that kept India in Pakistan's affairs for the rest of 2001 and onward both were said to have originated from Pakistan. The first was an attack October 1 on the legislative assembly in Indian-held Kashmir. While initial claim for this attack was made by a Pakistan-based militant group, the claim was later recounted. India was prepared to move into Pakistan in pursuit of those responsible. The United States initially asked Pakistan and India to set aside their differences while the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan was ongoing. By the end of the month, Indo-U.S. relations had progressed as the Taliban

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<sup>107</sup> Arun R. Swamy, "India in 2001: A Year of Living Dangerously," *Asian Survey* 42, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 173.

<sup>108</sup> Samina Yasmeen, "Unexpectedly at Center Stage: Pakistan," published in *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond*, Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn ed., (New York: Routledge, 2003), 191.

<sup>109</sup> Pervez Musharraf, "Highlights of General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation after 9/11," Sept. 19, 2001, resource online at <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesSpeeches/Addresses>, accessed June 7, 2006.

was quickly falling, and India eased its rhetoric against Pakistan. Only two months later, several armed attackers attempted to detonate explosives in the Indian parliament building while Parliament was in session. India immediately accused two militant groups from Pakistan for the attack, and claimed evidence proving these groups' ties to ISI support. U.S. intervention eased the tensions between the two countries, but Indian forces were deployed to the Pakistani border nonetheless. Pakistan responded in kind, and by the end of the year hostilities across the Kashmiri Line of Control were reported, in conjunction with the recall of diplomats and cessation of travel across the border.<sup>110</sup> While Pakistan was having to deal with yet more refugees from Afghanistan, the disapproval from extremist Islamic organizations within Pakistan, and American assertions that al Qaeda and Taliban elements were hiding in Pakistan's rural tribal areas, Musharraf had yet another incident with India right on the border.

Unfortunately for India, yet fortunately for Musharraf and Pakistan, India's assistance was not as vital to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan as was Pakistan's. The basic element was that Pakistan actually bordered Afghanistan, but it was a distinct advantage to the United States that Pakistan had more intelligence on Afghanistan stemming from Islamabad's relations with the Taliban. With its distrust in India's international motivation still embedded in its political culture, Islamabad could only interpret India's global accusations and its quick attempts to offer support for American actions as yet another chance for India to weaken Pakistan. In this climate, Pakistan could not afford to delay its announcement of support for the U.S. effort to depose the Taliban. This relatively swift turn away from relations with the Taliban, pledges to the United States, and a subsequent publishing of a plan toward secular politics in Pakistan could be seen as Musharraf's ploy to turn his tenuous situation into a position of advantage.<sup>111</sup> On the other hand, it could have been just the break Musharraf needed to move ahead with his vision, with India playing the unwitting final card that would empower Pakistan's hand.

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<sup>110</sup> Swamy, 175.

<sup>111</sup> Swamy, 174.

### C. SAUDI ARABIA

Of all the influence Saudi Arabia could be said to have in Southwest Asia, the most notable must be finances and people flooding the area during the Afghan-Soviet War. High on this list was Osama bin Laden, who not only traveled to Afghanistan to become a mujahid, but also tapped into his family's vast wealth to fund the Muslim fighters. The 9/11 Commission Report considers bin Laden's reputation was not necessarily built by his prowess on the battlefield, but by his generous donations helped fund the war.<sup>112</sup> He is further credited with financing the ISI's plan to put radical Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan by way of a coup in 1990,<sup>113</sup> illustrating further the complicated link between the influence of Saudi Arabia, and subsequently Pakistan, actually on the domestic affairs of post-war Afghanistan.

The Saudi government also provided significant funding to Pakistan, providing influence most of all to the power of the Inter-Services Intelligence bureau, or ISI. This government organization had some administrative ties to the military, but most significantly worked directly for the president. In the case of the Afghan-Soviet war, the ISI was used to support the policies of President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq; particularly with regard to domestic security and covert operations against Soviet forces or India. Although Zia enjoyed the support of the ISI, it was the personality of the organization that dictated its allegiances. After Zia's death and the subsequent election of Benazir Bhutto to as prime minister, the leading elements of the ISI used the organization in attempts to undermine Bhutto's influence.<sup>114</sup>

Saudi influence in this organization came in the form of massive financial support during the Afghan-Soviet war. Paired with financial support from the CIA, Saudi Arabia matched donations to the ISI, making it the most powerful single entity in Pakistan.<sup>115</sup> This support was initiated by the General Intelligence Division of Saudi Arabia, or the GID. Ultimately, the Saudi's official position on communism was of course heresy, as communism mandated atheism. This issue carried into the Saudi government's relationship with the United States, influencing Riyadh to maintain good relationships

<sup>112</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, 55.

<sup>113</sup> Coll, 211-2.

<sup>114</sup> Coll, 191-2.

<sup>115</sup> Coll, 65.

with the CIA for the purpose of causing the Soviet Union's demise.<sup>116</sup> While the attitude toward communism prevailed throughout the Muslim world, no other nation was in the position to wield so much financial backing to fighting its expansion as Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Saudi oil interests were threatened by the prospect of a Soviet advance so close to the kingdom. While the GID could not provide the level of intelligence service that Afghanistan required, the ISI could. Although CIA funding was directed to be filtered to mujahideen commanders, Saudi money was promised to ISI for whatever uses the agency felt necessary.<sup>117</sup>

Religious elements originating from Saudi Arabia during the 1980s struggle against the Soviets also caused significant impact to the domestic flavor of Pakistan. What can be described as a "turf war" between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran over post-war and Taliban Afghanistan certainly involved Pakistan as an international player. Indirectly, the Sunni-Shi'a struggle had a residual affect in neighboring Pakistan. The emergence of Wahabbi-style radical Islam, particularly in the northern rural areas of Pakistan and throughout Afghanistan, was facilitated by Zia ul-Haq's Islamization of Pakistan. Further, Zia's backing of extremist Islamic Afghan dissidents during the anti-Soviet war provided a welcoming environment for the growth of this extremist ideology in the madrasas in the Northwest and along the border areas with Afghanistan. However, after the death of Zia in 1988 and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, impending civil war in Afghanistan could have driven the extremist element out of the region – or at the very least reduced its influence. The resurgence of extremists from Saudi Arabia into Afghanistan, and thereby reinforcing the ideology in Pakistan, was motivated by the fear that Shi'ism would spread into Afghanistan from Iran. Although not quite the call to arms that the Soviets had inspired, the "turf war" over Afghanistan's religious future stimulated a renewed interest in securing an extreme Sunni influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>118</sup> More about Pakistan's political influence in post-war Afghanistan will be studied in Chapter Four.

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<sup>116</sup> Coll, 81.

<sup>117</sup> Coll, 71-3.

<sup>118</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 196-206.

#### **D. AFGHANISTAN**

As with Saudi Arabia, the cases of Afghanistan and the United States both had significant effects on the domestic politics of Pakistan. While some elements of influence are uniquely attributed to either country, the U.S. involvement in the Afghan-Soviet War and later in Operation Enduring Freedom pulls the three nations into a mix of influences.

Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have waxed and waned since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Relations were good during the reign of King Zahir Shah (r. 1963-1973) leaving Pakistan to focus on its disputes – including two wars – with India. Eventually tensions rose again when the king was successfully overthrown by his cousin, socialist Muhammad Daoud, in 1973. One of the main issues on Daoud's agenda was the reconciliation of all Pashtun tribal lands into its own nation; going so far as to deploy forces to the border with Pakistan. This problem arose for Pakistan at the same time as tensions between elements in Baluchistan and the central government rose to the point of violent action. Subsequently, the growing pressures from Afghanistan resulted in each country protecting dissidents from the other, until the impasse was breached by the invasion of the Soviet Army.<sup>119</sup>

The Afghan-Soviet War had special implications for Pakistan. Many Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan, flooding border-area madrasas with Afghan students and straining Pakistani infrastructure. From 1978 until 2001, Pakistan facilitated the relocation of some 3 million Afghan refugees.<sup>120</sup> Additionally, the more radical madrasas, made more so by Zia, emptied their classrooms and sent their students to help in Afghanistan's struggle against its godless invader. The shared identity and religious ties would bind the two countries for two more decades.

Although Pakistan's government denied any direct involvement in the anti-Soviet fight, its covert intelligence service ran a robust program that filtered U.S.-supplied weapons through Pakistan and to ISI.-selected mujahideen commanders in

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<sup>119</sup> Feroz Hassan Khan, "Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Strategic Insights* II, no. 1 (January, 2003), resource online at <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/jan03/southAsia.asp>, last accessed June, 2006.

<sup>120</sup> Yasmeen, 196.



Afghanistan.<sup>121</sup> Aside from the government involvement, thousands of students studying in Pakistani madrasas left school to join the fight.<sup>122</sup>

The momentum created by anti-Soviet fighters was so forceful that once the Soviets withdrew in 1988, the mujahideen continued its struggle for power, this time around Afghanistan. Without a common enemy, however, the fighters broke down into tribal factions once again, fighting each other for their own power within the country. As Pakistan was also immensely involved in the war, it was certainly to Pakistan's advantage to facilitate the installation of a friendly government in Kabul, thereby securing a strong partnership between the countries, instead of a recipe for future conflict.<sup>123</sup> However, with the withdrawal also of American support, Afghanistan had several years of civil conflict to come before the Taliban would take control of the country. Additionally, the death of Zia ul-Haq stopped short plans for the Islamization of Pakistan and of Zia's influence in Afghanistan, or the Taliban likely would have had quite an ally in Zia.<sup>124</sup>

However, the pendulum could not swing to the opposite side so quickly. Although Zia's death brought the elections that saw Benazir Bhutto to office, Zia's Islamization of the ISI and of the Pakistan Army would have more lasting effects. Before the elections, when Bhutto's party looked to sweep the popular vote, Pakistan's intelligence agency made two more big campaigns to follow Zia's influence in Pakistan, then further in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden was at this time – 1989 – back in Saudi Arabia. Pakistani intelligence officers, still wrapped up in Zia's influence and upset at the prospect of a liberal woman possibly ruling Pakistan, asked bin Laden for his assistance to help ensure Bhutto's party did not win the elections, thereby ensuring Bhutto never would take office. Bin Laden's Saudi-based finances also were called to bear to help secure power in Afghanistan for Hekmatyar. While bin Laden did enjoy good relations with the government of Saudi Arabia, his involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistani politics at the end of the decade may or may not have been under Saudi direction. However, bin Laden's substantial financial support, all from his family's

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<sup>121</sup> Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown, Penn.: Casemate, 1991), 3.

<sup>122</sup> Abbas, 112.

<sup>123</sup> Dorronsoro, 227.

<sup>124</sup> Abbas, 113-123.

Saudi-based business, certainly had influence here – albeit at the request of element of the Pakistani government. So, while Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia each had influence in Pakistan, at times those relationships led to influence flowing from Pakistan as well.<sup>125</sup>

Once the Taliban gained power in Afghanistan, radical forms of Islam in Pakistan found support from the neighbor to the west. Additionally, what would total three million refugees continued to stress Pakistan's domestic infrastructure. The back-and-forth governance of liberal Benazir Bhutto and Islamist Nawaz Sharif, is evidence that the Taliban's influence over Pakistan's domestic political environment was limited, even though later elections were alleged to be rigged.<sup>126</sup> It wasn't until the administration of Pervez Musharraf that the impasse would be broken.

The continued recognition and diplomatic relations with the Taliban very easily can be labeled as a good political move by Musharraf for his first years in office. With the wide support for the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the international connections with extreme elements in Pakistan, a porous border between the two nations, and the number of Afghan refugees still living in Pakistan, Musharraf could not afford the additional domestic instability that would inevitably come with publicly denouncing Taliban rule and severing diplomatic ties.<sup>127</sup> While the two governments had a least a working relationship, Musharraf guaranteed at least some measure of peace in his most troublesome regions, allowing him to focus his attention to more pressing matters of governance.

The attacks of September 11 can be viewed as the very break Musharraf needed to get free his association with the Taliban and establish relations with other nations. Early in establishment of the Bush administration in 2001, Musharraf began his quest for improved ties with the United States. Indian lobby groups in the United States had worked diligently during the campaign to secure White House attention, and Musharraf was anxious to begin his relationship with the new administration on the right note. During security turnover, the new administration came to understand that the threat from bin Laden was more than anticipated, and asked Pakistan for help in the capture of the

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<sup>125</sup> Coll, 210-2.

<sup>126</sup> Abbas, 133-5.

<sup>127</sup> Coll, 553, 557.

radical leader. Unfortunately, although Musharraf used what little political weight he carried in the region, Mullah Omar's steadfast refusal to bend to Pakistan's requests for any changes in policy.<sup>128</sup>

Of the three countries that had recognized the Taliban – Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan – Pakistan was the first. It also held the relationship the longest, as Pakistan was later the last to sever diplomatic ties.<sup>129</sup> It was a matter of time, and of diplomatic leverage that Pakistan retained its relationship with the Taliban. Soon after the September 11 attacks, moderate Pakistanis recognized Pakistan's "guilt by association" with the Taliban, and feared American reprisal to shift to Pakistan as well. Stated, public support for U.S. plans against the Taliban seemed the only reasonable option for Pakistan's future.<sup>130</sup> In the meantime, Islamabad chose to use its unique position to prevent hostile action.

Before committing fully to an anti-Taliban stance Musharraf used the relationship with his neighbor to try to persuade the Taliban to comply with United Nation demands of producing Osama bin Laden. In addition to the possible prevention of military action against Afghanistan, Musharraf hoped this diplomatic engagement would prove his desire to support his Islamic neighbor. When Pakistan's influence was proved ineffective, Islamabad successfully broke relations and focused on its promises to help the United States and other U.N. member nations to overthrow the Taliban and defeat al Qaeda. The unfortunate consequence to Musharraf's plan was that instead of convincing religious extremists in the region that he wanted a peaceful solution to the problem, Musharraf's willingness to surrender bin Laden – seen as giving up his life of privilege to fight for less fortunate Muslims – as evidence of Musharraf's submission to U.S. control. Instead of taking the next step toward domestic moderation, the severance of diplomatic ties with the Taliban and support of Operation Enduring Freedom defined and widened the rift between his administration and radical extremists. As a result, thousands of students from Pakistan's borderland madrasas were recruited to fight with the Taliban, crossing

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<sup>128</sup> Coll, 552-53.

<sup>129</sup> Coll, 349.

<sup>130</sup> Yasmeen, 191.

into Afghanistan each day by the hundreds, as well as many Pakistani citizens simply convinced this was the way to stop outside aggression and occupation of the region.<sup>131</sup>

Ultimately, it was the quick fall of the Taliban, and the actions of Taliban fighters against U.S. forces, that settled Pakistan's domestic upheaval. The ease of the defeat of these Taliban fighters put their legitimacy of protectors of Islam into question. Additionally, Pakistanis who had gone to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban were in some cases abandoned to fight the invading forces on their own – severely undermining the Taliban's legitimacy as an Islamic brotherhood. As a result, the silent moderates who had previously agreed with Musharraf's policies of Pakistan's new alliances were publicly relieved, and those in opposition began to change their opinions.<sup>132</sup>

## **E. UNITED STATES**

In a message to the U.S. State Department in 1995, former Special Envoy to the Afghan resistance Peter Tomsen wrote, "We have long underestimated the geo-political threat of Afghan instability to U.S. interests.... We should conduct a major Afghan policy review and implement a more resolute Afghan policy. A passive U.S. approach will continue to leave the field to the Pakistani and Arab groups supporting the Islamic extremists."<sup>133</sup> The United States did not maintain a relationship with Afghanistan or Pakistan, and Tomsen's prediction proved true. Today, the United States is waging an uphill battle to establish its influence in Southwest Asia to ensure the haven for militant extremists does not re-emerge to pose a threat to U.S. security.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan is the most important for the purposes of this study, particularly in light of the focus of the thesis. The historical influences of U.S. policy will be brief, with further study of U.S.-Pakistan relations explored in Chapter Five. Although the average American may be unfamiliar with the history of these two nations, more people in Pakistan hold very clear memories, one of which is the swift withdrawal of all U.S. support once it became clear that the Soviet

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<sup>131</sup> Yasmeen, 192-4.

<sup>132</sup> Yasmeen, 195, 197.

<sup>133</sup> Peter Tomsen, "Afghanistan Settlement – Analysis and Policy Recommendations," June 1977, declassified April 4, 2000, as reprinted in Coll, 352.

army was about to leave Afghanistan in 1988.<sup>134</sup> Just when Pakistan wanted to facilitate the installation of a friendly government in postwar Kabul, its forces and the ISI were caught in a civil war for which Pakistan was ill prepared.

The U.S. mission in Afghanistan via Pakistan placed no focus on the actual situation in Afghanistan. Instead, the CIA directed a war with the sole purpose of halting Soviet expansion in the region, away from American interests. Support was given to mujahideen commanders that showed the most promise of defeating the Soviet Army, and not for any legitimacy that organization might have held in a post-war Afghanistan. It should have been little wonder to those commanders then when the United States pulled support for their armies one Soviet forces began their withdrawal.<sup>135</sup> Unfortunately, once U.S. influence was no longer assured, Pakistan found its relations with India to be more tenuous. Previous issues that were still as yet unresolved were moved once again into positions of higher priority, but the lack of U.S. support weakened Pakistan's bargaining power.<sup>136</sup>

Because of this, U.S. intentions are not readily trusted by many Pakistanis.<sup>137</sup> This was made more evident by the events of early 2001, when the United States asked Pakistan to convince the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden. Although they understood the political implications, even liberal Pakistani civilians supported their diplomats' opinions that a Taliban-run Afghanistan was better for Pakistan than assistance from the United States, particularly with regard to the threat of India.<sup>138</sup> Additionally, while the attacks of September 11 provided Pakistan a timely opportunity to break ties with the Taliban and secure more support from the United States, Islamist groups viewed the attacks as an excuse for America to gain further ground toward a goal of increasing influence over the region.<sup>139</sup>

Indirectly, the American-led attack on Afghanistan in 2001 caused further domestic turmoil in Pakistan. With its history of support to millions of Afghan refugees

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<sup>134</sup> Abbas, 12.

<sup>135</sup> Kaplan, 170-1.

<sup>136</sup> Tahir-Kheli, 7-8.

<sup>137</sup> Yasmeen, 189.

<sup>138</sup> Coll, 554.

<sup>139</sup> Yasmeen, 194.

over the previous 23 years, Pakistan could not sustain the addition of more Afghans once the offensive began. To this end, Musharraf sealed the border between the two nations. Stories of Afghan civilians caught in the fight hit home with many Pakistanis, leaving many feeling guilty for their government's role in the deaths of innocent Muslims across the border. This consequence led to further demonstrations against the Musharraf regime, illustrating the stance ordinary Pakistanis were taking in the political showdown.<sup>140</sup>

Since it began its War on Terror, the United States has kept close ties with Pakistan. The history of the United States in Southwest Asia, particularly following the Afghan-Soviet War, puts the United States at a disadvantage for any new interaction with Pakistan. Long established opposition, extremist and militant elements have the luxury of credibility with the people of the rural areas. The U.S. government is facing the consequences of an earlier foreign policy that failed to keep the welfare of our allies in consideration.

## **F. CONCLUSION**

While no single political plan is ever perfectly correct for any given issue, the same can be said for the influence of alliances and neighbors: no one relationship can carry the burden for the development of a society. Pakistan's relationship with India has been its most tenuous, taking a large portion of Pakistan's foreign policy and domestic attention, but India can not be held responsible for the development of all of Pakistani society. Pakistan's own identity crisis at Partition made it a fertile breeding ground for all forms of idealistic power brokering. Circumstances affecting Pakistan's friends and neighbors only added variables to the equation, and strong influences from outside the immediate neighborhood were able to capitalize on Pakistan's unique position.

No generalizations can be made about the way Pakistan will, should, or would have ventured, given any other variable change. The important issue to remember when predicting Pakistan's future is to remember its past, and never to discount the memory of its people, the charisma of its leaders, or the passion of its culture. This is the

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<sup>140</sup> Yasmeen, 196.

environment in which Musharraf must work, and the realities he must consider when deciding which direction to take both in foreign relations and domestic politics.

Lawrence Ziring believes only one element is responsible for Pakistan's identity:

In reality, distant powers, no matter how intrusive, cannot be held responsible for the course a state chooses to follow. The complex character of the state is seen in the relationships of the people who are its citizens. Pakistanis have contributed ... to their repeated failure to define who and what they really are and what they intend to become.... A reluctance ... to discuss the nation's conflicted ethos, to achieve consensus on the path to be followed, is at the core of the problem.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Ziring, 295.

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## **IV. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN 1999 TO MUSHARRAF'S PROGRESS IN 2006**

“Pakistan’s thorny journey through history depicts a panorama of scheming politicians, military chauvinism, bureaucratic arrogance, constitutional pitfalls, feudal lords, and democratic frailty.” – Khalid Mahmud Arif<sup>142</sup>

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The history of religious political activism in the region offers a context against which to judge the policies of the most recent administrations in Pakistan. The influences of regional conflicts and international relations on the domestic political situation in Pakistan during the course of its development also brings to light several plausible reasons why this inherited sense of political participation never resulted in a stable, permanent representative government. These were the contributing factors to the environment into which Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf stepped when he assumed the role of Chief Executive on October 12, 1999. The second Sharif administration (1997-1999) provided not the healing Pakistan needed from the tragedies of the Zia ul-Haq influence, nor did it produce the integrity of governance to counter the Benazir Bhutto terms; but brought instead a swift and deliberate consolidation of power with little regard for the welfare of the nation or those who helped run it.

In October 1998, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat chose to resign his position, three months before the end of his term. As a strong leg in Pakistan’s political system, the Army Chief had worked for more than a year – since the installation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – to support the government’s initiatives and ensure the smooth progress of the nation. Sharif chose General Pervez Musharraf to fill the post, promoting Musharraf above two other generals senior to him. Sharif’s intent in Musharraf was to be certain that the new Army Chief would not pose a threat to Sharif’s administration, leaving Sharif confident that his control over the military would strengthen unchallenged. Additionally, Sharif hoped the move would prevent any

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<sup>142</sup> Arif, 90.

chances of a military coup d'état, as he saw in Musharraf no inclination for the assumption of power over the nation.<sup>143</sup>

While Sharif's instincts were correct about Musharraf's intent, Sharif underestimated the effect that his own political goals over the course of the next year would have on his relationship with the rest of the military. Attitudes among the various political groups, religious parties, military loyalties and domestic friction and distrust finally were too much for Sharif's leadership to overcome. In a final attempt to assert control over the military, Sharif unwittingly initiated the coup that would remove him from power.<sup>144</sup>

Considering the complicated political landscape of Pakistan, mixed with a history of militant extremism, Taliban influence, inconsistent U.S. support, and an ever-changing constitution and national identity, Musharraf walks a precarious path in his quest for a stable, democratic, successful, secular Muslim state. Pakistan's importance in the region both strategically and geographically have placed it at the top of the U.S. government's priority list, which also opens Pakistan and Musharraf to incredible international scrutiny – from both sides of the Islamist issue and all sides of the Indian subcontinent.

From the beginning Musharraf had a Herculean task thrust upon him. The best way to understand what he faced, and to further evaluate how he chose to tackle his responsibilities and goals, is to study first the political environment that had formed by the time he took office. Next, a survey of Musharraf's goals in 1999, with the new goals added in 2001 once the United States took a greater interest in Pakistan's affairs, sets the scene for a review of current U.S. policy toward Pakistan and the furtherance of Musharraf's goal.

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<sup>143</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-E-Meel Publications, 2003), 231-2.

<sup>144</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan in 1999: Back to Square One," *Asian Survey* 40, no. 1 (January-February 2000), 211.

## **B. POLITICAL ACTORS**

### **1. The Army and the Regime**

The military and the government of Pakistan have developed a symbiotic relationship since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Partition came about so late in the independence process and was implemented so quickly that Pakistan was nothing more than an idea upon its creation, and a general idea at that. No structure of governance, civil institutions, or even a shared vision of national identity had been established. Many visions grew in the minds of charismatic potential leaders, but the vision of the one person who led the nation was barely understood by his closest peers by the time of his death little more than a year later. Of the millions of Muslims who made their way to the new nation from other parts of India, many of them had yet even to arrive in Pakistan before Muhammad Ali Jinnah succumbed to his illness. Bloody sectarian violence marked much of the transition, and the members of the trained professional military were the only resource to settle the environment and get the new nation on its way. Khalid Mahmud Arif points out that after 23 years of existence, Pakistan finally had its first national elections, due to the actions of its military head of state, General Yahya Khan. He further notes that the elections, “failed to inject political sanity”<sup>145</sup> – a clear illustration that an election does not a democracy make. He continues to outline other influences on the development of Pakistani political evolution, but his summary is the most telling, where he concludes, “that the Pakistan Army obeyed the Chief of the Army Staff, followed his decisions in letter and spirit, and exposed those who tried to undermine the military and national unity.”<sup>146</sup> This is a clear indication of the perception that the military’s role in Pakistani politics is not only that of safety net, but of a force prepared to ensure the path of the nation follows the course toward stability. Although others have tried and been sidetracked or failed, this attempt must succeed or face the clear probability of the failure of Pakistan as a whole.<sup>147</sup>

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif never believed he would have to fall back on the military to stabilize Pakistan, and so proceeded to amass political power for his own office, and neglecting issues for the good of the military. When, as the military

<sup>145</sup> Arif, 90-1

<sup>146</sup> Arif, 124

<sup>147</sup> Karamat, (May 26, 2006).

representative to the government, his Chief of Army Staff proclaimed Sharif's domestic policies unsound, Sharif demanded his resignation. In his place, Sharif named a lower ranking officer, General Pervez Musharraf, ahead of more experienced military officers.<sup>148</sup>

One main consideration for Sharif's choice of Musharraf was an attempt to play on ethnic and linguistic divides. Should Musharraf surprise him by entertaining notions of seizing power, Sharif mistakenly relied on the predominantly Punjabi-Pakhtun officer corps to support a Punjabi prime minister over a New Delhi immigrant army chief.<sup>149</sup> Coincidentally, Sharif's conservative predecessor dealt with similar rulers. Zia appointed General Mirza Aslam Beg as his Vice Chief of the Army Staff after Zia's coup, over his longtime friend and favored candidate General Shams ur-Rahman Kallue, because Kallue did not agree with Zia's martial law. The resultant rumor was the Beg was preferred by Zia because of his migrant history, and therefore would not have standing with the Punjabi military.<sup>150</sup>

Sharif's plan had two major flaws: first, that his delays and interference in military promotions and transfers created animosity within the military; second, that Sharif misjudged the environment and professionalism of the military. Sharif's ploy to slow promotions and delay transfers was an attempt to emphasize control over the military. The unintended consequence was that an organization such as a national military, with a history and standard of training originating from the British during India's colonization, would not easily back down with such minor misuses of power. Instead, Sharif's inconveniences, coupled with the forced resignation of their previous commander only a year before, convinced army commanders that Sharif's actions would break the army's long-standing role as part of the country's political machinery.<sup>151</sup> This point was also illustrated by the lack of a civil war in Pakistan following the 1999 "counter-coup." Benazir Bhutto is credited with the opinion that Sharif's loyalists within the army would try to reverse the events, putting Sharif back in office. Writer Iftikhar

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<sup>148</sup> Malik (2001), 106-7.

<sup>149</sup> Rizvi (2000), 209-211.

<sup>150</sup> Abbas, 137.

<sup>151</sup> Rizvi (2000), 212-3.

Malik discredited this likelihood, again because of the history of the army to rally for the good of all over individual differences.<sup>152</sup>

Historically, individual examples include army commanders who harbored desires to mold Pakistan into their own vision. However, the majority of senior staff officers were concerned with characteristics commonly recognized by professional militaries around the world. Concepts such as unit and organizational cohesion and military discipline won out over personal gain and power.<sup>153</sup> This outlook of the army has been fostered by the many years that the institution has had to step in to maintain political stability. Not surprisingly, this view finds its roots in the personality of the British army, by which Pakistan's military was formed and by which it was trained. The perpetuation and growth of this identity of "guarantors" and "central to state survival" was reinforced by civilian administrators who always took comfort in the knowledge that they could fall back to the support of the army if governance ever became too difficult a task.<sup>154</sup> Although this integrated military fall-back proved to be a stabilizing force, the long-term development of Pakistani governance failed to materialize specifically because the safety net of the military structure prevented the civilian governance from embracing the challenge.

## **2. Political Parties**

Outside of the army's influence, civilian political parties continued to work their way back to governance in the late 1980s. The pendulum of political influence in Pakistan settled into perpetual motion, with each party winning successive administration, and each trying to undo the influence of the other. More accurately, however, it was more of a constant battle between two families. Arif observes, "The country is rich in family-controlled and autocratic parties in which the genes and means take precedence over competence and the accident of birth provides a sure ladder for leadership."<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>Malik, 107-8

<sup>153</sup> Abbas, 5-6

<sup>154</sup> Rizvi (2003), 6. See also Arif, 84.

<sup>155</sup> Arif, 91-2.

This phenomenon began with Zulfikar Bhutto, and despite Zia ul-Haq's military beginning and tie to the army, the pendulum swung to the other end of the spectrum with Zia ul-Haq's very conservative, Islamist rule. Benazir Bhutto was elected directly following Zia's death, believing as many did that she was the natural successor to her father's legacy. Finally, Nawaz Sharif, pegged as the natural successor to Zia by many, represented the dissatisfaction his family felt when their very successful family business – expanded to a chain of steel factories – was nationalized by Zulfikar Bhutto. His rise in politics was not coincidental – his family epitomized the conservative flavor Zia had attempted during his rule. Sharif was selected to lead one of the two main elements of the Muslim League in Pakistan, which in turn was incorporated into the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IIJ). This alliance was comprised of the religious parties as well as the factions of the Muslim League – the support structure for General Mohammed Zia's conservative views of governance.<sup>156</sup> And so it continued, back and forth between the Bhutto and Sharif camps, until each had ruled twice, and their camps each had ruled three times.

These two parties and their associated alliances were not the only influence on the domestic agenda in the 1990s.

PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The Muslim League as a single, major political player in Pakistan diminished within a few years after Partition, partly due to the fact that its main political goal had been accomplished: a separate state for Muslims.<sup>157</sup> However, the League continued to function on a lesser scale, and by the late 20th Century was split into two main factions. The faction led by Nawaz Sharif commanded the most electoral power. Whether this was due to popularity or shady election manipulation has been a subject of discussion. The other faction follows more of a political philosophy favorable to the Bhutto camp, and is much weaker politically.<sup>158</sup> Another opinion states that the name “Muslim League” was simply expropriated for the purpose of rallying support for Field Marshal Ayub Khan (r. 1958-1969) in the 1960s.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Abbas, 134-6

<sup>157</sup> Arif, 93

<sup>158</sup> Pierre LaFrance, “Political Parties in Pakistan: Roles and Limitations,” *Pakistan: The Contours of State and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 236-240.

<sup>159</sup> Craig Baxter, “Political Development in Pakistan,” in Hafeez Malik, (2001), 135.

Sharif's party seems to follow a similar political style as the platform of the American Republican Party.<sup>160</sup> A smaller role of the central government and allowing the economic and social evolution of the nation take its own course with minimal "steering" from the government are elements of the PML-N view of political leadership. Industrial privatization is preferred, with an emphasis on "industrial expansion" to provide for a higher standard of living through better employment opportunities.<sup>161</sup>

PPP – Pakistan People's Party. This was the political party of Benazir Bhutto, who essentially inherited her place in the leadership from her father. A moderate party by design, the party was set to win by a landslide in the elections of 1989. Fearing a total shift to moderate policies, conservative leaders rallied to assemble a force capable of softening the PPP's influence in the government.<sup>162</sup>

Just as the PML-N resembles the Republicans, This influential political party's platform resembles that of the American Democratic Party.<sup>163</sup> The security of landowners is thought to be realized through the welfare of the working classes, ensuring a suitable standard of living. The party tends to follow a style that results in bigger roles for the government if it means providing social services for the average citizen.<sup>164</sup> Under Benazir Bhutto's first term, 1988-1990, the press enjoyed more liberties, women felt free to engage in public debate, and political views of all types were allowed expression.<sup>165</sup>

MQM – Muhajir (later Muttehida) Quami Movement of Sindh. This party could be categorized under political parties or under radical elements. Hassan Abbas observed that by 1989 the MQM had "become a highly monolithic and violence-friendly organization masquerading as a political party."<sup>166</sup> However, it did control the Sindh province, particularly the urban areas.

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<sup>160</sup> Information on the Republican National Committee, its platform and positions on contemporary domestic issues found online, at <http://www.gop.com>, accessed June 12, 2006.

<sup>161</sup> LaFrance, 237-8.

<sup>162</sup> Abbas, 136-7.

<sup>163</sup> Information on the Democratic National Committee, its platform and positions on contemporary domestic issues found online, at <http://www.democrats.org>, accessed June 12, 2006.

<sup>164</sup> LaFrance, 236-7.

<sup>165</sup> Mahmood Monshipouri and Amjad Samuel, "Development and Democracy in Pakistan: Tenuous or Plausible Nexus?" *Asian Survey* 35, no. 11 (November 1995), 981.

<sup>166</sup> Abbas, 139.

One issue of contention against Musharraf is the power he took from the hands of the provincial governors and pushed to the elected councils of the local governments. Where the bureaucracy tried to micromanage day-to-day issues at a much higher level, basic necessities were neglected. Although the new system is much more efficient for the realization of projects and sanitation at the local level, provincial governors are reluctant to share their authority and so oppose the plan. The same can be said for the example of the PPP and the MQM in 1989.

When Benazir Bhutto's party won the national election and she was named Prime Minister, Bhutto ran into some political obstacles; the consequences of which she did not realize. Although her party won the overall election, the MQM controlled the governance of the Sindh. Coordination between the two parties was crucial to successful governance of the province, but since neither party wanted to relinquish any political control, the two became adversaries. "With the active hostility [between the two], the governance of Karachi and Hyderabad virtually came to a halt."<sup>167</sup> The impetus behind the adversarial relationship was the unwillingness of the central government to give up control of any province, regardless of the degree, coupled with the refusal of the provincial party to compromise its power structure.

PNA – Pakistan National Alliance. This conglomerate of parties came together in 1977 to oppose Zulfikar Bhutto when the Prime Minister announced elections a year prior to their scheduled date. At the time, Bhutto saw no cause for concern of his own re-election, and was feeling politically euphoric as the leader of the only democratic nation in the Indian subcontinent. However, the disapproval of his governance ran so strongly that many parties not usually associated with each other – the conservative Islamists Jama'at-i Islami and the secular, nearly socialist Awami National Party – joined ranks to oppose Bhutto's bid for another term. At this point, three parties then taking the name Muslim League all opposed the PPP and joined the PNA. When Bhutto's PPP won a huge majority in Parliament, allegations of rigged elections forced Bhutto to resign.<sup>168</sup>

IJI – Islamic Democratic Alliance. A similar association developed to oppose the PPP when Benazir Bhutto looked to be the first woman to lead Pakistan – in fact, to lead

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<sup>167</sup> Abbas, 139.

<sup>168</sup> Abbas, 84-5. See also Baxter, 135.



any Muslim country – in 1989. The two main Muslim League factions came together with many of the more influential religious-based political parties. The most unique element of this alliance was that it was created by Hamid Gul, the Director General of the ISI, marking the first use of religious parties by the military for the purpose of electoral politics.<sup>169</sup>

PONM – Pakistan’s Oppressed Nations Movement. This conglomerate of political parties and 28 ethnic and regional nationalist groups joined forces in 1998 against Sharif’s most oppressive changes and policies. Sharif had traveled too far down the path of sectarian, Islamist ideology for the identity of Pakistan, leaving many minorities suffering. The alliance asked for a “loose federation of autonomous and sovereign ethnic nations,” although its main focus was to keep Sharif from becoming the Pakistani equivalent to Afghanistan’s Mullah Omar.<sup>170</sup> It ultimately fell apart in 1999 when leaders of the individual parties failed to stay united against the regime and chose instead to compete against each other. However, the force of this and other consolidated movements brought the failures of the administration into focus with the general population, resulting in the support of a new regime later that year.

### **3. Cleric-led Political Parties**

Jama’at-i Islami. One opinion of Pakistan’s political process claims that no political party is an actual party except that of Jama’at-i Islami. However, this particular opinion also claims that this group is “electorally irrelevant,” and that though well organized, its only impact on electoral politics is when it publicly supports one of the major political factions.<sup>171</sup> This party remained part of the IJI, which backed Sharif’s PML-N party in the 1990 general elections.

Jamiat-i Ulama-i Islam and Jama’at-i Ulema-i Pakistan. These religious-based parties, based on the Deobandi and Barelwi schools, respectively, command some power to motivate the masses, if the cause is to oppose a government policy they deem contrary to Islam. Their influence, however, is usually limited to specific remote areas,

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<sup>169</sup> Abbas, 134-8.

<sup>170</sup> Ziring, 247.

<sup>171</sup> Baxter, 134.

predominantly in the Northwest Frontier Province.<sup>172</sup> However, since these remote areas along the Pakistan-Afghan border are the regions of the least influence by Islamabad, the parties can have substantial influence to rally opposition to policies the federal government tries to implement along the border.

An example of their influence within their regions was the opposition to the Sharif-Vajpayee summit in Lahore in 1999. Although the historic visit represented a thawing of relations and seemingly an Indian acceptance of Pakistan's governance, Jama'at-i Islami kept the public sentiment of Indian treatment of Kashmiris as a frontline issue, making any other statements seem like publicity stunts.

#### **4. Radical and Militant Elements**

"In parts of NWFP and Baluchistan, especially the areas adjacent to Afghanistan, Islamic zealots often challenged the local authorities and vowed to set up an Islamic order on the lines of the Taliban in Afghanistan."<sup>173</sup> Although these elements do not necessarily restrict themselves to the border areas, it is outside the urban areas that the central government has less influence. Some of these organizations are outlined here.

TNFJ/TJP – Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja'fariyya/Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya Pakistan. Originally established as TNFJ, this Shi'a-based group was unhappy with the laws implemented by Zia ul-Haq that favored Sunnis over Shi'a. The drastic show of force in Islamabad in 1980 so intimidated the regime that the group's demands were met: Shi'a representation in government advisory positions, exemption from government mandated *zakat*, and freedom for Shi'a to administer to their own religious affairs. Further demands were thought to be the group's insistence not only of the repeal of Hanafi interpretation of Shari'a law, but the implementation of the Shi'a interpretation. The timing of this movement followed the Shi'a Revolution in Iran, so this desire to implement Shi'a interpretation was easily associated with Tehran's desire to spread its brand of Shi'a outside of Iran. In order to avoid this association and to ensure continued political weight, the group changed its name to Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya Pakistan – The Movement of the Ja'fari-Shi'a of Pakistan. Although the movement began as a radical,

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<sup>172</sup> Baxter, 136.

<sup>173</sup> Rizvi, (2000), 209.

militant force in opposition to an oppressive regime, it later softened its stance and now claims a stance of moderation in government.<sup>174</sup>

Sipah-i Muhammad. The new-found moderation of the TJP does not sit well with this related organization. Comprised predominantly of younger men, the Sipah-i Muhammad prefers a more radical militant approach to the opposition of Sunni influence in Pakistan. Influence and ideology is spread through mosques and madrasas, as it is in Sunni-based organizations. This group has been held responsible for violent attacks on Sunnis in Karachi and the Punjab.<sup>175</sup>

Sipah-i Sahaba. This radical group essentially mirrors the Sipah-i Muhammad, except that it serves the same interests in the Sunni groups. Ardently adhering to today's brand of Deobandism, the Sipah-i Sahaba support the declaration of Ahmadi Sunnis to be non-Muslims, due to the latter's belief that its founder was another Prophet. Due to its Deobandi foundation, any group with a different interpretation of Islam from its own is motivation for action. However, the Sipah-I Sahaba claim not to judge those who have fallen away from the "correct" teachings, but to want to guide the lost back to the true path, particularly those in the rural areas who are easily persuaded to take the wrong path. Those who influence others away from the "true path" are those who suffer the group's attacks. The actions of the Sipah-i Sahaba are similar to those of its Shi'a counterpart, leading each group to cite the violence of the other as the justification of their own existence.<sup>176</sup>

## **5. Political Corruption**

The ease with which politicians in Pakistan have been able to manipulate the system for their own gain has been referenced in the various deeds of the political parties. It is sufficient to note here that the extent of the corruption was not lost on Pakistani society. The practice had so permeated political action, and had so frustrated the population that Musharraf felt it necessary to address the issue immediately upon assuming the role of Chief Executive. The problem ranked as high as the proliferation of

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<sup>174</sup> Zaman, 693-97.

<sup>175</sup> Zaman, 698-9.

<sup>176</sup> Zaman, 698-702.

radical Islamist ideology in Musharraf's view, and both were so problematic that a large portion of his address was spent reassuring Pakistanis that he would work toward an honest government that would allow the people to practice their respective faiths freely. His agenda that followed all promised to work within these goals.<sup>177</sup>

### **C. MUSHARRAF'S PLAN 1999**

With the political environment structured as outlined here, Musharraf's goals from his first days as Chief Executive were themselves ambitious. He promised to root out the institutionalized corruption within the government and legislative systems.<sup>178</sup> However, the crux of the corruption was embedded within the moderate political machines, and the most honest players seemed to be the religious-based political parties.

Musharraf outlined seven objectives in his speech to the nation five days after assuming office:

1. Rebuild national confidence and morale.
2. Strengthen federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion.
3. Revive economy and restore investor confidence.
4. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice.
5. Depoliticize state institutions.
6. Devolution of power to the grass-roots level.
7. Ensure swift and across-the-board accountability.<sup>179</sup>

Of these, Musharraf first placed special emphasis on the growth of the economy, followed by the accountability of the government. Next, he combines the goals to strengthen the federation and decentralize power, claiming one a result of the other. His plan was to identify what elements of day-to-day, civic administration could be relegated to an elected council at the local level, and to do so. His intended result was to make

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<sup>177</sup> Musharraf (1999).

<sup>178</sup> Musharraf (1999).

<sup>179</sup> Musharraf (1999).

those in the local systems accountable to the citizens of their cities; be faster and more efficient in the business of basic services such as road repair and garbage removal and management; and to make Pakistanis feel more connected and better representative of their elected governments.<sup>180</sup>

#### **D. MUSHARRAF’S REVISION, 2001: DOMESTIC POLICIES TOWARD ENLIGHTENED MODERATION**

##### **1. Education Reform**

Pakistan has never enjoyed a state-supported education system, while mosques and religious groups have run their own schools for more than 150 years in the subcontinent. While some madrasas were established just as schools for one standard of religious studies, such as the Deobani school, others began as a way to prepare Muslims of the region for well paying jobs within the government and society. During the Afghan-Soviet war throughout the 1980s, radical religious elements entered the schools and began the schools’ drift toward extreme ideologies.<sup>181</sup>

The World Bank recently commissioned a study that concluded that of Pakistan’s 19 million school-going children, less than 1 percent attended these schools of extreme religious ideology.<sup>182</sup> While this figure is promising, this still leaves nearly 190,000 children attending these boarding schools that instill only the very narrowly defined version of Islam espoused by the Wahabbi sect based in Saudi Arabia.

Another issue to consider about these schools is their methods for teaching Islam. The Qur’an is learned in Arabic, although according to a census in 1981, only 18 percent of Pakistanis could read the text. Classic Arabic is understood, “only by a handful of men of religion in the madrasas, and by a few university academics and researchers who practice Islam.”<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Karamat, (May 26, 2006)

<sup>181</sup> See Chapter 2

<sup>182</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006). See also “World bank In Pakistan: Country Brief,” resource available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Resources/PK06.pdf>, last accessed June 8, 2006.

<sup>183</sup> *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, Christophe Jaffrelot ed., Gillian Beaumont trans. (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 251-2.

The biggest draw of the madrasa, particularly in poverty-stricken rural areas, is not its promise to teach Islam, but its guarantee of housing and food for its students. A family can send its young boys to a madrasa and only worry about feeding and housing its girls and very young boys, reducing the burden on the family.<sup>184</sup> Until the economic boom reaches these rural areas, families will continue to send their children to these boarding schools. The only way to ensure the students get a complete education and the exposure to more than one interpretation of the Qur'an is the process currently underway: accountability for the curricula of all schools operating in Pakistan. While Pakistan is working to develop its own state-supported education system, Islamabad has instituted a registration and review process for all schools in Pakistan. Essentially, each school first is asked to register with the government. Once registered, the school's teaching resources, staff, and curricula are reviewed, comparing them to the standards set by the government. Schools that are found to have substandard resources or staff are asked to upgrade to the standard or cease operations. The government reports that this process is going well, noting only a handful of schools that have refused to register or reform.<sup>185</sup>

Recent independent reporting notes that the Higher Education Commission, a program created by the government only two years ago, is actively recruiting teachers and professors, paying more than competitive salaries, and focusing on issues such as tenure and research – issues education professionals claim as priorities.<sup>186</sup> However, criticism still flows regarding the content of some textbooks still distributed by the government that “still promote hatred against non-Muslims and urge jihad, or holy war.”<sup>187</sup> Even the progress report from the 9/11 Commission claims that the United States has not done its part to reform education and educational opportunities and programs, specifically citing Pakistan's libraries as an example of this failure.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Jaffrelot, 252.

<sup>185</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

<sup>186</sup> Farhan Bokhari, “Teachers in Demand as Pakistan Reforms Education: After Years of Neglect, State-run Universities are Being Revamped and Funding Raised,” (London) *Financial Times* (April 6, 2006), 21.

<sup>187</sup> Paul Watson, “In Pakistan's Public Schools, Jihad Still Part of Lesson Plan,” *Los Angeles Times* (August 18, 2005), A1.

<sup>188</sup> “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations,” (December 5, 2005), resource available online at [http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05\\_report.pdf](http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf), accessed June 12, 2006.

The problem with education reform is not with the resources, but in that the system can only handle so much work at one time.<sup>189</sup> The 9/11 Commission progress report cites only specific items it deemed necessary to curb the spread of extremist ideology through educational reforms, awarding grades of “D” to the United States in the categories of “Scholarship, Exchange and Library Programs” and “Support [of] Secular Education in Muslim Countries.” The report did award a grade of “C+” in the category, “Support Pakistan Against Extremists.” While not a stellar evaluation, the first comment claims, “U.S. assistance to Pakistan has not moved sufficiently beyond security assistance to include significant funding for education efforts.”<sup>190</sup> Again however, according to the government of Pakistan, the money is sufficient, but the system can only absorb a finite amount of change at a time.<sup>191</sup>

## **2. Infrastructure Development**

Several major development projects to the infrastructure around the country are in the planning stages, or already in progress. Two of these projects are expected to increase the income of Pakistan in the way of trade and transit. The port city of Karachi is developing a robust port facility, to include the construction and integration of inland facilities. Since a port would do the country little good if the products could not be delivered to or from the facilities, major road improvements from Karachi are planned. At least two major gas pipelines are under negotiation with Pakistan’s neighbors, using Pakistan’s geographical position to facilitate the transportation of fuels and natural gas from east to west, and from the north to the port.

In order to facilitate the movement of workers, and to ease the traffic burdens of some of Pakistan’s larger cities, mass transit systems are coming online in busy urban areas of Karachi, and particularly in Lahore. The government is convinced that the fruits of these projects will mean more productive opportunities for its people, and more chances for growth that will spread outside the cities.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006). See also later section covering economic resources available for education reform.

<sup>190</sup> 9/11 Commission (2005).

<sup>191</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

<sup>192</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

### 3. Economic Development

Musharraf's plans for economic development were disappointing in his first year, but have taken off in recent years as some of his programs have begun to take hold. The unemployment rate in 2000 is credited with an increase in Pakistani applications for U.S. work visas. Reports of citizens' complaints that the military regime was not showing the anticipated economic growth were profiled in various publications, supporting a general criticism of a military regime.<sup>193</sup>

Recent years, however, have begun to show substantial economic rewards for Pakistan. Pakistan boasts an impressive 8.4 percent growth of GDP for 2005, and so far counts on a 6.5 percent growth for 2006.<sup>194</sup> While the International Monetary Fund has confirmed these figures, it warns that more adjustments to the fiscal policy are required if Pakistan wants to see its economic growth permanent.<sup>195</sup> This cautious praise by the IMF is outweighed by a recent report that cites significant international contributions following the earthquake October 8, 2005, but also commends Pakistan's accelerated economic growth as a sure step toward a healthy economy.<sup>196</sup>

Ultimately, the next impact that these infrastructure developments and economic programs Musharraf hopes to see is the reduction of militant extremists. With the government and society helping Pakistanis build the foundation for a better future, Musharraf believes the allure of extremist movements will fade.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Pamela Constable, "Poverty, Political Uncertainty Drive Pakistanis to Seek U.S. Visas," *The Washington Post* (Sept. 24 2000), A30.

<sup>194</sup> Pervez Musharraf, "President's Press Conference at World Economic Forum," (Jan. 26, 2006) resource available online at <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesPressRoom/PressConferences/130200650007AMPRESSCONFERENCE.pdf>, last accessed June 13 2006.

<sup>195</sup> Henri Lorie, "A Growth Promoting Fiscal Policy for Pakistan," remarks at the pre-budget seminar of *The Nation* newspaper (May 16, 2006), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/country/PAK/r/2006/eng/051606.pdf>, accessed June 8, 2006.

<sup>196</sup> International Monetary Fund, "Earthquake Should Not Have a Major Impact on Pakistan's Economic Prospects," *IMF Survey* 35, no. 2, (Jan. 23, 2006), 20. Resource available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2006/012306.pdf>, accessed June, 2006.

<sup>197</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).



## **E. U.S. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN**

The United States played a major role in the administration of Pakistan's affairs during the Soviet-Afghan War, when it funded the Afghan resistance via Pakistan's ISI. Essentially, proving this power to the ISI, and by proxy to Zia ul-Haq, the United States legitimized the state of affairs within Pakistan. Once the Soviet Army began its withdrawal, U.S. support dried up, leaving the new Bhutto administration with little support from the only remaining superpower. Many Pakistanis today have an institutionalized memory of good U.S.-Pakistan relations in the past, but are wary of the United States' intentions due to the previous withdrawal of support.<sup>198</sup> Ultimately, Pakistanis in general understand that good relations with the United States will result in development, modernity and economic success.<sup>199</sup> Although the United States did maintain relations with Pakistan, the result was not nearly as beneficial to Pakistan, particularly due to U.S. pressure regarding Pakistan's nuclear program.<sup>200</sup> As late as September, 2000, the image of U.S.-Pakistan relations was contrasted against the U.S.-India relationship. The contrast was striking, implying that the United States strongly favored its relationship with India over lukewarm acceptance of Pakistan's military leader.<sup>201</sup> The United States became more of an obstacle than a supporter between 1990 and 2001.

### **1. Political Pressure**

Nuclear non-proliferation. The United States recently came to an agreement with India regarding India's nuclear capabilities, and the U.S. acceptance of further nuclear development. However, the same issues were not even discussed with Pakistan during the following stop on the presidential trip. The Center for Strategic and International Studies noted in its report of Bush's trip that the president responded to a reporter that, "no such deal was in the cards for Pakistan because of its 'different history,'" then concluded the comment was the president's way to refer indirectly to the former head of

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<sup>198</sup> Tahir-Kheli, 3-7.

<sup>199</sup> Jehangir Karamat to an audience at University of California Berkeley, April 17, 2006.

<sup>200</sup> Tahir-Kheli, 8.

<sup>201</sup> Pamela Constable, "Pakistani Losing War of Images; Indian Rival Steals Spotlight in the U.S.," *The Washington Post* (Sept. 16, 2000), A15.

Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is accused of selling Pakistan's nuclear technology to Iran.<sup>202</sup>

Taliban. Militant extremists in Pakistan support the Taliban and condemn Musharraf for working with the United States against their Muslim brethren, and for allowing American air strikes on Pakistani border villages where innocents are reportedly killed. While still trying to make religious extremism irrelevant, this balancing act puts Musharraf in a precarious situation. Pakistan insists that the prime element in the equation to determine the success of moderation in Pakistan is the normalization of relations with India, and the stabilization of Afghanistan. These two issues could decide whether Enlightened Moderation succeeds or fails.<sup>203</sup>

An interesting development on this front again is the 9/11 Commission progress report. Under the category "Long-Term Commitment to Afghanistan," the U.S. government is awarded a grade of "B."<sup>204</sup> Though that report was published in December, 2005, news reports for June 13, 2006 tell of three weeks of intense fighting between U.S. forces and a force of insurgents that is larger and "better organized" than initially thought.<sup>205</sup>

Congressional exceptions. The U.S. House of Representatives' subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, under the House Appropriations Committee, wrote in its report that Pakistan has demonstrated an "increasing lack of respect for human rights, ... and [a] lack of progress on improving democratic governance and rule of law."<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Pramit Mitra and Teresita Schaffer, "Pakistan and the United States: Sweet and Sour," *South Asia Monitor* 94 (May 5, 2006). See also David Montero, "Frustration Mounts Between US, Pakistan," *Christian Science Monitor* (May 31, 2006).

<sup>203</sup> Karamat, (May 26, 2006). See also Karamat presentation, April 17, 2006

<sup>204</sup> 9/11 Commission (2005).

<sup>205</sup> "40 Dead in Violence in Afghanistan," *Los Angeles Times* (June 13, 2006), A20.

<sup>206</sup> House Report 109-486, House Resolution 5522, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2007"

For several years, the United States has stalled an agreement to sell F-16 fighter jet aircraft to Pakistan due to Pakistan's nuclear program. However, Bush recently promised Musharraf that the United States would "move forward" with the plan.<sup>207</sup>

## **2. Security Cooperation**

Despite the political agenda items that have plagued the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, overall the government of Pakistan reports that relations with various U.S. agencies are progressing very well according to Pakistan's estimates.

One program with which Pakistan reports success is a bilateral training program between new Pakistani anti-narcotics officers and international trainers from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.<sup>208</sup> While no verification of this specific partnership was available from the DEA, the agency's fact book lists "international training" as one of its foreign cooperation initiatives.<sup>209</sup> Pakistan reports the recent acquisition of better communication equipment and helicopters to help its new squad, noting that the team now is capable to perform drug interdiction operations against drug smugglers.<sup>210</sup>

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency reported that in March 2006, Pakistan entered into an agreement with the United States regarding the security of containers being shipped between Pakistan and the United States. The Container Security Initiative will allow for the screening of all containers shipped between the two countries for terrorists and terrorist weapons.<sup>211</sup> Pakistan also reports that with the help of the United States, Pakistan's border operations, passport and identification processes have improved significantly, resulting in better capabilities for Pakistan to control the crossing of its borders and the identification of its citizens and visitors. While these projects are

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<sup>207</sup> "United States and Pakistan: Long-Term Strategic Partners," U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet (Mar. 4, 2006), resource available online at <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/62592.htm>, last accessed June 12, 2006.

<sup>208</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

<sup>209</sup> U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration official web site, resource available online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/fci.htm>, last accessed June 13, 2006.

<sup>210</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006).

<sup>211</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protection official web site, resource available online at [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news\\_releases/032006/03072006\\_2.xml](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/032006/03072006_2.xml), last accessed June 15, 2006.

not yet to the standard Pakistan hopes to achieve, the process takes time to complete, and Pakistan believes the progress is excellent.<sup>212</sup>

### **3. Continuing Relations**

The most recent development for the realization of long-term stability and growth for Pakistan has been the establishment of bilateral “dialogs” between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistani representatives will discuss developments, obstacles and techniques in different areas and settings with their American counterparts. The hope is that by establishing a regular meeting to discuss issues relating to a variety of public administration areas, Pakistan’s move along a track toward modernity, moderation and stabilization will continue into the next administration and beyond.<sup>213</sup>

The dialogs, each scheduled and conducted independently of the others, are broken down into four subjects: 1) Strategic. 2) Energy. 3) Economic and Trade. 4) Education, Science and Technology.

## **F. WORLD BANK**

The World Bank has been involved in Pakistan’s economic restructuring for several years, though assistance has increased immensely since 2000. The last country brief written by the organization notes, “Beginning in 2000, the government initiated a wide-ranging and ambitious reform program,” resulting in a drastic turn of economic events in Pakistan.<sup>214</sup> World Bank advisors are involved in every facet of Pakistan’s domestic environment, such as farming programs to increase productivity in Baluchistan to upgraded education facilities and opportunities in the North West Frontier Province.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006)

<sup>213</sup> Karamat (May 26, 2006). These dialogs were also mentioned in a joint press conference between U.S. President George Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, March 4, 2006 in Islamabad. See also “United States-Pakistan Economic Cooperation,” State Department Fact Sheet, resource available online at <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/62595.htm>, accessed June 10, 2006.

<sup>214</sup> The World Bank in Pakistan, resource available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Resources/PK06.pdf>, July, 2005, last accessed June 8, 2006.

<sup>215</sup> The World Bank, resources available online at <http://www.worldbank.org/pk>, last accessed June 8, 2006.

The institution last year awarded a \$100 million credit to Pakistan for the sole purpose of expanding education in the Punjab.<sup>216</sup>

## **G. CONCLUSION**

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was correct in assuming Musharraf would not harbor secret plans to stage a coup; because of this, Musharraf had no plan in reserve for the transition of the government and changes in domestic policy to get Pakistan on a road of recovery. Once Musharraf was thrust into leadership Musharraf's prompt formulation of a public policy once in office is telling. His goals were simple and clear, and his plan concise. He assumed this task was rather simple: root out corruption, bring moderate thinkers into governance. However, as he learned the intricacies of the situation, Musharraf had to balance his new plans with the influence of the past, the dynamic of the social polity of Pakistan, and the resources available to him. When al Qaeda executed the attacks on the United States in September, 2001, the tide for Musharraf turned, and he was able to reengage his goals, and identify a few new ones. While Musharraf still faces opposition within the country, and certainly political pressure from his neighbors and the United States, his policies must be considered within the context of the political and social domestic environment he inherited, not the environments from which his critics come.

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<sup>216</sup> "World Bank Approves US \$100 million to Enhance Quality and Access to Education in Punjab," *Coventry*, from wire reports (March 30, 2005), 1. For information regarding hundreds of detailed programs funded by the World Bank, visit the World Bank web site at <http://www.worldbank.org/pk>.

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## V. SUMMARY, OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

“President Musharraf envisions a modern state that provides an alternative to radicalism.” – President George W. Bush<sup>217</sup>

Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf did not have plans to run Pakistan, but one fateful day in 1999 placed him in that situation. The best Musharraf could do for his nation at that time was to take the hand he had been dealt and play it to the best of his ability, trying to develop a better life for his countrymen. Outsiders – and insiders – freely criticize his programs and policies, and insist his goals are contrary to what Musharraf claims publicly. However, one main flaw with much of this criticism lies in the basis for comparison: Pakistan’s dynamic is different from the dynamic of any other country, and must be treated as such. Policies that work in one country, even a nation resembling Pakistan, may not produce results in this society.

Different elements of the U.S. government have vastly different ways of approaching a problem. Adding independent commissions and special investigators just adds to the opinions proscribing how the United States should accomplish its very complex goals. In such a multi-faceted political system, the diversity of opinions ensures that as many possible courses of action and subsequent adjustments are explored. The concern, however, comes from the lack of acknowledgement of opinions between agencies. The 9/11 Commission Progress Report outlined what the commission deemed were failures of the administration in the realization of that commissions stated goals. Congressional resolutions insist that progress claimed by the executive branch is really not progress, and insist Pakistan change its practice with the highest urgency. It is difficult enough for those participating in this debate to keep clear all of the facets of this complex situation; for average Americans and Pakistanis busy making better lives for themselves and their families, these intricacies are not as transparent. Therefore, these contradictions are thrust to the front of the news, abused and misinterpreted by unscrupulous elements seeking their own power gain, and confusing the voter trying to

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<sup>217</sup> George W. Bush, “Joint Press Conference of President Musharraf and President Bush,” Islamabad, March 4, 2006, resource available online at <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/FilesPressRoom/PressConferences/3142006101353PMMusharrafBushJointPC.pdf>, last accessed June 8, 2006.

decide on which course of action will prove to be the best at election time. Again, no one perfect solution will ever exist that solves all problems of administering to the needs of a nation. However, in a true democracy, the voter must be well informed in order to cast a ballot for the course most amenable.

On the one hand, the International Monetary Fund believes overall that Pakistan is on a clear path toward economic stability and continued growth.<sup>218</sup> This is a great evaluation on the surface, except for the underlying idea that, “the consistent pattern that runs through all of the governments is a negative correlation between the economic growth rate and sociopolitical liberalization and related democratic consolidation. No government has thus far been able to combine significant economic growth with stable social and political change.”<sup>219</sup> No one correct course of action, no one complete evaluation.

#### **A. CHALLENGES**

The example Benazir Bhutto provides in her party’s dealings with the MQM in the Sindh shows a wonderful parallel to the discourse Musharraf faces today in his attempts to decentralize some administrative affairs of society. Provincial governments resent the transfer of some of their power to local councils, though some services are better provided by those councils. It comes down to the premise that no one likes changes when those changes are decided for them. The hope is that these provincial leaders will come to understand that these changes result in services that better the lives in their constituencies, and therefore stabilize their provinces.

Political mobilization, whether secular or sectarian, is not a new concept in Pakistan. The people of the region have had very definite views of how government is expected to serve the people. As noted in Chapter 2, the religious based mobilization machines have been in play for more than a century and a half, and secular elements from all ethnic groups have participated in representative government since well before Independence. Chapter 4 outlines such a variety of political groups representing

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<sup>218</sup>International Monetary Fund, “Earthquake Should Not Have a Major Impact on Pakistan’s Economic Prospects,” *IMF Survey* 35, no. 2, (January 23, 2006), 20. Resource available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2006/012306.pdf>

<sup>219</sup> Monshipouri, 986.



constituencies of religious, ethnic, moderate, radical and secular interests. One factor preventing the development of a true civil society and representative democracy has been outside influence – Pakistan has found itself in the midst of unrivaled political unrest since its establishment. However, the one factor that remains constant through it all is the lack of representation of the federal leaders – presidents and prime ministers – to the actual needs and desires of the people.

Elections do not equal democracy. Simply putting candidates on a ballot and allowing the population to choose their leaders is not an indicator of a democracy. A balance of power among the government institutions – authority which cannot be revoked at the whim of a power-hungry leader – is essential to the maintenance of a stable democracy. The government should not be defined by the people sitting in the respective offices, but the responsibilities that those offices require of the representatives who occupy them. The rights of the individual must be guaranteed, regardless of the personal views of the head of state; and the heads of state must be accountable to those they claim to serve, with mechanisms in place for a formalized, procedural removal if that leader fails. Only by ensuring these balanced powers – balanced between the government departments, and balanced between the government and its constituents – regardless of religion, ethnicity, profession or lineage, can democracy take hold and persevere, regardless of the face in the office.

This begs the further question: if Pakistan has never known this kind of individuality in participatory politics, how will it establish and grow? As demonstrated in this thesis, Pakistanis have long followed traditions of tribalism, religious loyalty, and clientism. Changing these attitudes and perceptions cannot happen over the course of one administration; usually it cannot happen over the course of one generation. This does not mean that all hope is lost. Perhaps Pakistan's domestic political identity will never be compared to that of the United States. This is not a bad thing and should never be judged as a failed experiment. Pakistan is a different society and has a different history and culture – and sees a different relationship between governance and religion. Its people must approach the future with their own identities and personalities, but it can be a stable, moderate, democratic future.

One important facet in this growth is the ability to access and share ideas. Education is the single central element to this. People who can read the written reports and opinions of others, particularly those coming from outside points of view, are so much less likely to be influenced by single-scope, radical personalities in search only of their own power base. An informed constituency that elects a representative is in a much better position to back that leader when the tide turns, as those voters have access to all points of view and understand their candidate's weaknesses; and they understand his or her strengths. An informed, educated public is less susceptible to political corruption and manipulation, because the candidate's ulterior motives and secret agenda are much more easily exposed and not secret for long.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

From an outsider's perspective, and considering the issues addressed in this study, the following suggestions are offered.

### **1. United States**

*Pressure subsequent Pakistani administrations to continue the dialogs on education, economics, strategic and energy.* U.S. support and relations with Pakistan have fluctuated almost as dramatically as Pakistan's leadership. In order to assure the next elected administration stays along the same track toward a stabilized democracy, that administration should understand that the United States is a strong ally, but requires particular elements to maintain that relationship.

*Stabilize Afghanistan.* With the recent attention on the political instability in Afghanistan, highlighted by the pending transfer of operations to NATO and the implication that the United States is leaving Afghanistan, the most urgent requirement for the road toward stability is the feeling of the people to understand and see progress in the reconstruction of their country. Encourage the Karzai administration to work closely with the Musharraf government for ideas to make this happen.

*Be patient.* Some of the major reform items, such as establishing a standardized education system, take significant time to develop, particularly from the little that existed prior to the current Pakistani government. Assist Pakistan in the development of realistic

and real goals – such as the approval, printing and distribution of textbooks – then assist in the achievement of each goal.

***Allow Pakistan to serve as a liaison between its neighbors and the United States.*** The familiar face is more readily believed than the stranger. If Pakistan can conduct working negotiations with Iran regarding Iran's nuclear program, then the United States should consider Pakistan a cooperative partner in the campaign to stop nuclear proliferation. As determined out in Ch. 2, it is entirely too easy for the home team representatives, e.g. the extremists, to make the outsiders look like the invading, imperialistic, crusading horde. Iran is in the doubly unique position that it has not had relations with the U.S. in more than 25 years, unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, which enjoyed relations as late as 1996 and 1990, respectively. Iran controls the message within Iran, but the Pakistani story can garner an audience in Iran.

## **2. Pakistan**

All four Chief Martial Law Administrators (Ayub, Yahya, Bhutto, and Zia) also wore Presidential hats. This was an administrative, legal and diplomatic requirement as the country had to have a head of state to function. But in the spirit of law their designation was a misnomer. The four Presidents were in reality absolute military rulers who did not derive their authority either from the Constitution, which was abrogated or suspended, or from the Parliament, which did not exist. It was a rule by absolute power that did not allow for any checks and balances.<sup>220</sup>

***Solidify Governance.*** Musharraf must take care not to be perceived as the type of military leader described above, although he also cannot appear to be weak. The greatest example of an abuse of power in recent years was Nawaz Sharif's second term. It is entirely too easy for a strong prime minister or president in Pakistan to dismiss members of the government and replace them with people of their own choosing. Therefore, Pakistan's parliament is urged to amend the Constitution to necessitate the approval of the legislature before any other amendments can be enacted. The Constitution is too easy to modify, as demonstrated by Zia ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Additionally, the judicial branch may have a voice in the judgments of executive acts, but its legitimacy with politicians is weak.

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<sup>220</sup> Arif, 86

***Standardize the education plan.*** Determine in which language government documents will be provided to the public, then agree to teach that language in all Pakistani schools. One strength of the extremist madrasas is that the Qur'an is taught in Arabic, though the students are not taught how to speak Arabic. This gives the administrators of these schools the freedom to interpret the text for their students, dictating their version of its intent. Allowing all Pakistanis the opportunity to read the important documents and historical texts, as well as their own Qur'an in its original Arabic, will open the idea that government and its accountability actually is for the people. Create a committee within Parliament to review the content of proposed standardized textbooks. Once approved, the U.S. and Pakistan can work together to utilize some of the education funds to mass-produce these books for distribution to all schools around the country.<sup>221</sup>

***Establish strong relations with the new Afghan government, and establish bilateral programs to spread the successes of Pakistan to Afghanistan.***<sup>222</sup> Each program that succeeds in Pakistan should be presented to Afghanistan, with the "lessons learned" by Pakistan to make the evolution easier for the Afghan government to complete. Although not every policy enacted in Pakistan will work in Afghanistan, but the sharing of ideas will facilitate stronger ties between the two countries. As stated in the 9/11 Commission Report, a stable Pakistan is the key to stabilizing Afghanistan. However, as stated by Karamat, the best thing for continued stability in Pakistan is a stable Afghanistan. Like the two tracks of the Enlightened Moderation plan, the two nations' identities must be grown and developed concurrently, not consecutively.

***Establish a robust public communication plan.*** The biggest tragedy in the formation of the idea of Pakistan was that the leadership's vision died with the leader. The people never came to understand what Jinnah envisioned for the type of governance that would work for Pakistan. The easiest way to undo what has been done is for the

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<sup>221</sup> Ambassador Karamat was satisfied with the available finances for education reform, but the system can only absorb a bit of this reform at a time. In the meantime, other items on the education checklist could be addressed and funded.

<sup>222</sup> In his first address as Chief Executive, Musharraf said, "The strengthening of brotherly ties with the Islamic countries will be a central pillar of our foreign policy. We shall continue our efforts to achieve a just and peaceful solution in Afghanistan. We wish to see a truly representative government in Kabul." This is a great plan that should be revisited.

people of the areas outside Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore to support a charismatic candidate who can rally the masses behind some ideology that starts the move away from modernity and moderation. The people should be confident they know what their elected representatives are doing, how they intend to accomplish projects, and results of a plan as it begins to produce. In this way, the people stay involved in the process, the progress is identified as belonging to the elected government, and it calls attention to the improvements in citizens' quality of life. The more communication is in the process, the better the people will remember what the government is trying to do, and the less likely they'll be to support regression.<sup>223</sup>

***Formulate a clear timeline for some of the major milestones in several of the most important domestic goals.*** While Islamabad gets credit for raising the standards for university educators, the criticism is still rampant over the context of textbooks and the quality of elementary education. While this incredible overhaul can not possibly happen in a very short time, a clear, concise timeline for the realization of finite milestones, and a regular report on the progress of each milestone, will instill confidence in the domestic society and international critics in the true intent and the probability of success of the government with regard to these initiatives.

***Continue with a plan to find a solution to Kashmir.*** Sometimes what is right is not always popular. Lawrence Ziring noted, "Jinnah's vision of a secular state could not be articulated, let alone adopted, by the politicians who succeeded him on his death. Moreover, war in Kashmir between India and Pakistan and the failure to bring an end to that conflict sealed the fate of the democratic experiment even before it could be tested. Too much of the Muslim psyche was focused on the territory of Kashmir and from the beginning successive Pakistan government would be measured by their commitment to liberating the Kashmiri Muslims from the clutches of the Hindus."<sup>224</sup> The leader who brings an end to the violence and ambivalence of Kashmir, and begins the healing process between Pakistan and India over this disputed territory, will do an immeasurable service to both nations. While concessions offered are rarely appreciated in the

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<sup>223</sup> Communication does not mean propaganda. Societies controlled by charismatic leaders in the past will be more skeptical of any message forced by the government.

<sup>224</sup> Ziring, 71.

beginning, the overall benefit of a peaceful Kashmir will outweigh the dissent. Additionally, resources previously committed to the military and political stalemate can be used to heal Pakistan and its relations with India and Afghanistan.

### **C. SUMMARY**

Pakistan has had an amazing journey in its quest for a secure homeland for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. The turmoil and trouble witnessed by the citizens of Pakistan has not disintegrated their drive for the success of their state. While no political plan has all of the answers to all of the questions, Enlightened Moderation shows significant initial signs of success.

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